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INTRODUCTION 
Congress declared the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
1
 a victory 
for women and civil rights advocates.
2
 After all, before the Civil Rights Act 
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, white women could not 
                                                          
*Assistant Professor of Law, Belmont University College of Law. This author would like to thank the 
Honorable Robert W. Wooldridge, Jr., at George Mason University School of Law, for his 
encouragement and editing assistance with this paper.  This author also appreciates the editing assistance 
of her research assistants, Nathan S. King, Patrick D. Ober, and Anna M. Waller. 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (damages provisions codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)). 
2. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 35,060 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (declaring that the Civil 
Rights Act was a ―major step forward‖ in protecting women from sex discrimination in the workplace); 
137 CONG. REC. 35,098 (1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (calling the Civil Rights Act a ―landmark 
civil rights bill‖ and praising its passage). 
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recover damages for intentional sex discrimination.
3
 Victims of sex 
discrimination were limited only to equitable relief such as back pay, 
reinstatement, and injunctive relief.
4
 So, Congress said, the Civil Rights Act 
was a victory because white women who sued under Title VII could finally 
recover damages.
5
 
But the ―victory‖ was only partial. The Civil Rights Act capped a victim‘s 
recovery to a maximum of $300,000 in combined compensatory and punitive 
damages, a stark contrast to the unlimited compensatory and punitive damages
6
 
available to black women who sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
7
 Congress said 
that capped damages was the best remedy they could provide under the 
circumstances.
8
  It was a compromise necessary to secure passage of the bill.
9
 
The time for compromise has long since passed, if it ever existed, yet we 
continue to accept Title VII‘s codified version of injustice.
10
 In the more than 
                                                          
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988)); see also 137 CONG. REC. 35,100 (1991) (statement of Sen. Packwood) 
(―When Congress pass[ed] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it provided that the remedies for 
intentional discrimination . . . would be primarily ‗equitable‘ – that is, you could get injunctions to stop 
the illegal treatment, and you could get reinstated to your job, and maybe back pay if you were illegally 
fired.  You could not get compensatory damages, which are designed to compensate you for losses you 
suffered like doctor bills . . . . You could not get punitive damages, which are designed, in egregious 
cases, to punish the wrongdoer who caused the discrimination.‖). 
4. Congress amended the remedies available to a prevailing plaintiff under Title VII in 1972. See 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 4(g), 86 Stat. 103, 107 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006)); see also 2 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1775-1858 (3d ed. 1996). 
5. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 35,060 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (acknowledging that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 ―failed to achieve total parity between the damages available to them and the 
damages available to those covered under section 1981‖). 
6. See Civil Rights Act, supra note 1, at § 102(b)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). 
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (specifically exempting claims 
under § 1981 from the caps applying to damages arising from claims under Title VII). 
8. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 35,100 (1991) (statement of Sen. Packwood) (stating that ―[w]hen we 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, I and some of my distinguished colleagues noted that they were 
uncomfortable with the still-unequal remedy scheme, and would continue to advocate for uncapped 
damages for all‖); id. (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (declaring the caps ―on damages in the Civil Rights 
Act represented a compromise necessitated by concern about passing a bill which would be signed by 
the President. Now that this step has been taken, we need to take the next step: the elimination of a 
damage scheme that itself discriminates against victims of employment discrimination.‖). 
9. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 35,060 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that the caps were 
part of a compromise package); 137 CONG. REC. 35,100 (1991) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) 
(acknowledging that the Civil Rights Act was not perfect but arguing that a compromise was necessary 
to move forward). 
10. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 35,098-99 (1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (explaining that ―the 
new remedy created a glaring inequity by placing a ceiling on the amount of damages that can be 
recovered . . . . There is no justification for this double standard . . . . Women . . . are not second-class 
citizens, and they do not deserve second-class remedies.‖); 137 CONG. REC. 35,101 (1991) (statement of 
Sen. Wellstone) (declaring that he ―know[s] of no legitimate reason . . . that justifies this difference in 
treatment. Illegal discrimination of any kind wounds its victims. Illegal discrimination of any kind 
diminishes us as a society and as a Nation. We cannot say that one kind of discrimination is better or 
less reprehensible than another. The existence of a two-tier system of remedies says to the victims of . . . 
discrimination that what they have suffered is of lesser importance; it says to the perpetrators of this 
discrimination that the law has greater tolerance for their conduct. Neither is true.‖). 
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twenty years since Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act, the caps on 
compensatory and punitive damages remain.
11
 Indeed, Congress has not once 
increased the caps for inflation. Thus, the maximum limit of liability for the 
largest employer remains $300,000, exactly as it was when Congress first 
passed the Civil Rights Act more than twenty years ago.
12
 
There have been numerous attempts to repeal the caps, but all have failed.
13
 
The first attempt, the Equal Remedies Act of 1991, was proposed by the late 
Senator Edward Kennedy five days after President Bush signed the Civil Rights 
Act, but it died in the Senate.
14
 Senator Kennedy also proposed the last attempt 
at repeal in 2008, with the bill enjoying nineteen cosponsors, including then–
Senators Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.
15
 Despite the support of these key 
Democrats, the 2008 bill also failed to make it to a floor vote and no similar 
legislation has been proposed in Congress since. 
The failure to repeal the caps should not be taken as a sign that they are 
acceptable. These caps are now, just as they were then, unequal and 
discriminatory. Although one of the goals of the Civil Rights Act was to 
equalize the remedies between victims of discrimination suing under § 1981 
and Title VII, the Act only codified the disparity it allegedly sought to 
correct.
16
 Most importantly, the legislative history surrounding the enactment 
of the Civil Rights Act demonstrates that Congress knew it was creating a 
―double-standard‖
17
 that treated women victims as ―second-class citizens,‖
18
 
but it nonetheless approved the caps endorsed by the Bush administration.  
                                                          
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006) (capping a defendant‘s exposure to compensatory and 
punitive damages at $50,000 if the employer has 15 to 100 employees; at $100,000 if the employer has 
101 to 200 employees; at $200,000 if the employer has 201 to 500 employees; and at $300,000 if the 
employer has 501 or more employees).  
12. Id. 
13. See Equal Remedies Act of 1991, S. 1422, 102d Cong. (1991); Equal Remedies Act of 1991, 
H.R. 3975, 102d Cong. (1991); Equal Remedies Act of 1993, H.R. 224, 103d Cong. (1993); Equal 
Remedies Act of 1993, S. 17, 103d Cong. (1993); Equal Remedies Act of 1995, H.R. 96, 104th Cong. 
(1995); Equal Remedies Act of 1995, S. 296, 104th Cong. (1995); Equal Remedies Act of 1997, S. 516, 
105th Cong. (1997); Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil 
Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. §§ 531-32 (as introduced, Feb. 11, 2004); Fairness and 
Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, 108th 
Cong. §§ 531-32 (as introduced, Feb. 12, 2004); Equal Remedies Act of 2007, S. 1928, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. §§ 441-42 (as introduced, Jan. 23, 2008); 
Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110 Cong. §§ 441-42 (as introduced, Jan. 24, 2008). 
14. See Equal Remedies Act of 1991, S. 1422, 102d Cong. (1991); Equal Remedies Act of 1991, 
H.R. 3975, 102d Cong. (1991). Senator Hatch also introduced the Employee Equity and Job 
Preservation Act of 1991, and while it removed caps on damages for all employers with 50 or more 
employees, it preserved a cap of $50,000 for claims against smaller employers. See Employee Equity 
and Job Preservation Act of 1991, S. 2053, 102d Cong. (1991). 
15. See Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. § 442 (as introduced, Jan. 24, 2008). 
16. See, e.g., Michael W. Roskiewicz, Title VII Remedies: Lifting the Statutory Caps From the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 391, 408, 418 (1993). 
17. See supra note 10 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
18. Id. 
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Specifically, the legislative history shows concern by Republicans that should 
women be allowed to sue for monetary damages, it would create a flood of 
sexual harassment claims. Therefore, they capped the awards to limit the 
possible recovery of these suits. 
These caps are not based on the extent of a victim‘s injuries. Nor are the 
caps variable based on the egregiousness of the employer‘s conduct. They also 
are not designed to deter and punish, given that the only loose connection to an 
employer‘s net worth is an assessment of the number of employees it retained 
during the relevant calendar year.
19
 Thus, various plaintiffs have challenged the 
reduction of their jury awards on the grounds that the caps violate the due 
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution because they 
―intentionally and arbitrarily discriminate[] against women.‖
20
 Others have 
argued that the caps violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, 
because the caps require an inflexible reduction of jury awards and, therefore, 
violate the jury‘s historic obligation to determine damages.
21
 
This article takes a novel approach and reexamines the legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 with a central focus 
on exploring the issue of capped damages. Part I begins by briefly contrasting 
and summarizing the diverging remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 
Title VII. The article then shifts in Part II to an examination of the political 
climate and legislative history that forged the enactment of the 1991 Act, 
paying particular attention to the debate surrounding damages. This history 
reveals that many members of Congress had a discriminatory motive in capping 
damages for victims of sex discrimination under Title VII, and therefore, that 
these capped damages represent a codified version of injustice. Although prior 
scholarship documents the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, it 
fails to adequately address the issue of capped damages. Thus, this legislative 
history is a substantial contribution to contemporary Title VII scholarship, as it 
provides necessary context for the current debate about whether to abolish the 
existing Title VII damage regime. 
                                                          
19. See, e.g., Sandra Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 227, 
242-43 (2009) (demonstrating why the damage caps under Title VII are ―an inappropriate measure of 
constitutional excessiveness‖ because they ―are not directly tied to punishment and deterrence,‖ are not 
adjusted for inflation, and may be arbitrary). 
20. Appellant‘s Opening Brief at 23, 44, Lansdale v. Hi-Health Supermart Corp., 314 F.3d 355 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-16017, 97-2555); see also Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F.3d 780, 804-05 (8th Cir. 
2001), cert. granted and vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 919 (2002); Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 945-46 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 532 U.S. 843 (2001); Means v. Shyam Corp. 
44 F.Supp.2d 129, 131- 133 (D. N.H. 1999); see also Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass‘n, 977 F. Supp. 
464, 470 (D. D.C. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
21. See, e.g., Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F.3d 780, 804-05 (8th Cir. 2001); Appellant‘s Opening 
Brief at 53, Lansdale v. Hi-Health Supermart Corp., 314 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-16017, 97-
2555). 
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Based on the findings documented in this legislative history, this article 
asserts in Part III that the time is long overdue for repealing the caps on 
damages codified by the Civil Rights Act and ending the injustice created by 
the two-tiered damages regime.
22
 Part III explores the theoretical and practical 
consequences of the ceiling placed on damages to victims of intentional 
discrimination. It examines the practical consequences of applying statutory 
caps to claims of sex discrimination by reviewing reductions in damages and 
other complications caused by the caps. Part III also considers various 
constitutional challenges asserted in the federal courts by litigants who objected 
to some of the reductions. Finally, Part IV of this article concludes by 
evaluating various solutions to the current remedial scheme. In light of the 
discriminatory animus revealed by the legislative history, this article endorses a 
complete repeal of the caps. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF COMPROMISE: A HISTORICAL REMINDER OF THE 
ENACTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF § 1981 AND TITLE VII 
Before examining the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it 
is important to review the context of the laws impacted by the legislation. The 
1991 Act amended the remedial scheme for both § 1981 and Title VII.
23
  
Therefore, part of this contextual discussion will include a brief overview of the 
substance of the rights afforded to claimants under Title VII and § 1981 as 
those rights existed in 1990. This analysis will briefly compare claimants‘ 
rights under § 1981 with those provided to individuals suing under Title VII, 
and analyze the limitations of these statutes prior to the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. 
Although § 1981 and Title VII were created more than a century apart, 
both were the result of powerful activist movements seeking to improve the 
living conditions and rights afforded to African-Americans. Section 1981 is a 
broadly worded statute guaranteeing, in sweeping language to newly freed 
slaves, the ―right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.‖
24
 Originally enacted under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                          
22. Nothing in this article should be interpreted to suggest that the Civil Rights Act does not also 
cap damages for other qualifying victims of discrimination under Title VII.  For instance, the restrictions 
on damages also apply equally to victims of religious and disability discrimination as well as others. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (applying the caps to victims of gender, religious discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(a)(2) (applying the caps to victims of disability discrimination). Rather, this article seeks to 
document the evidence of gender bias in the Congressional debate, because sex discrimination–not 
religion or disability discrimination—is what motivated Congress in 1991 to amend the remedial 
provisions of Title VII. 
23. See Civil Rights Act, supra note 1, at § 102. 
24. Section 1981 currently states: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 
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1866,
25
 it was passed to enforce the newly ratified Thirteenth Amendment.
26
 
Indeed, one of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to confirm its 
constitutionality, and Congress later re-enacted the provisions of Section 1 of 
the 1866 Act to mirror the ―all persons‖ language in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
27
 The enactment of § 1981 was undoubtedly a victory for 
Reconstructionists,
28
 but the statute largely lay dormant for a century due to 
several initial Court decisions restrictively interpreting similar civil rights 
statutes.
29
 
Not only is the language in the statute broad, but it also is noticeably silent 
with respect to some of the more common provisions found in modern civil 
rights statutes. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1981 did not specify the 
remedies available to prevailing claimants. Furthermore, the Reconstruction 
Congresses did not define the concept of race in § 1981, provide the pertinent 
statute of limitations, denote which entities were restrained by its provisions, or 
enumerate the scope of its right of contractual freedom.
 30
 
Beginning in 1968, the Warren and early Burger Courts
31
 revived § 1981
32
 
and issued a series of decisions that capitalized on § 1981‘s broad language and 
vastly expanded its scope.
33
  First, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
34
 the Court 
expanded the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to prohibit private as well as state-
                                                          
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
25. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866), re-enacted and amended by Voting Rights Act 
of 1870 § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 1, at §101. 
26. STEPHEN N. SHULMAN & CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY ¶ 12.01 (1990); see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW § 2.12 
(5th ed. 2004). 
27. Barbara A. Bayliss, Note, Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji: Cosmetic Surgery or a Fresh 
Breadth For Section 1981, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 77, 79-80 (1988). 
28. See BELL, supra note 26, at § 2.12. 
29. See SHULMAN & ABERNATHY, supra note 26, at ¶ 12.01; see also Elyse Hilton, Private Clubs 
and Employment Discrimination: Does Federal Law Apply?, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 622 (1987–
88) (citing decisions restrictively interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Danielle Tarantolo, Note, 
From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law For the Independent 
Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 184-89 (2006); Note, The Thirteenth Amendment and Private 
Affirmative Action, 89 YALE L. J. 399, 400 (1979). 
30. See Bayliss, supra note 27, at 81-82. 
31. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium: Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s, Reneging on 
History?  Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 622 (1991) 
(characterizing the Warren Court and early Burger Court as ―progressive‖ and documenting ―dynamic 
and liberal interpretation‖ of civil rights laws). 
32. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
33. See St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. 
Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
34. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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sponsored
35
 racial discrimination in the sale of property.
36
 The Court later 
broadened its interpretation of § 1981 by holding that the prohibition against 
racial discrimination in contracts also applies to private contracts of 
employment.
37
 
The Court both expanded the scope of the contractual claim afforded by § 
1981 and the scope of those protected by the statute. Despite legislative history 
indicating that the 1866 Act was intended to protect newly freed slaves, and 
statutory language guaranteeing them the rights ―enjoyed by white citizens,‖ 
the Court declared that § 1981 protected white citizens as well as African-
Americans.
38
 The Court subsequently permitted an Arab immigrant to bring a 
claim under § 1981, unanimously concluding that Congress intended the statute 
to encompass intentional discrimination ―solely because of . . . ancestry or 
ethnic characteristics.‖
39
 
Similarly, the text of § 1981 did not specify the remedies available to 
prevailing parties.
40
 Yet again, the Court broadly interpreted the statute and 
held that individuals suing under § 1981 were eligible to recover both equitable 
relief and tort-like damages, including compensatory and punitive damages.
41
 
Given the availability of damages, a claimant also was entitled to request a jury 
trial under the Seventh Amendment.
42
 Thus, by interpreting the statute‘s broad 
language expansively, the Court fashioned § 1981 into one of the most 
powerful weapons in combating race discrimination.
43
 
Just as § 1981 sought to ensure the property and contractual rights of newly 
freed slaves, the driving force behind the enactment of Title VII also was ―the 
plight of the Negro in our economy.‖
44
 Economic conditions continued to 
deteriorate for African-Americans during the 1940s and 1950s,
45
 and during the 
century of § 1981‘s dormancy, ―blacks had no effective legal machinery for 
dealing with employment discrimination.‖
46
 President Kennedy originally 
                                                          
35. But see Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948) (holding that Section 1981 applies only to state-
sponsored action), rev’d in part by Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 392 U.S. 409, 436-37. 
36. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 436-37. 
37. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60. 
38. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 273 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
39. St. Francis Coll., 481 U.S. 604, 605. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). 
41. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60. 
42. See SHULMAN & ABERNATHY supra note 26, at ¶ 12.08. 
43. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, Comment, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 596, 598-99 (1988) (examining Section 1981‘s importance in the ―fabric of our law‖ 
and declaring that it is the ―third most important‖ federal civil rights law). 
44. 110 CONG. REC. 6,548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (quoting Senator Humphrey‘s remarks). 
45. See Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII’s Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 219, 
229 (1994) (explaining that unemployment rates for African-Americans were ―generally double the rate 
of white unemployment‖ by 1958). 
46. BELL, supra note 26, at 640. 
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proposed Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1963,
47
 declaring that ―the 
time has come for the Congress of the United States to join with the Executive 
and Judicial Branches in making it clear to all that race has no place in 
American life or law.‖
48
 Given that the Court had not yet revived § 1981, the 
enactment of the Act was crucial toward the fight to eradicate race 
discrimination and stem the violence of racial riots in the South.
49
 After what 
some have described as the ―longest debate in congressional history,‖
50
 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1964. 
The intended beneficiaries of the 1964 Act were African-Americans,
51
 so 
feminists largely were ―absent during the proceedings regarding Title VII.‖
52
 In 
fact, it is widely believed that the provision adding sex as a characteristic 
protected from discrimination was included as a last minute floor amendment 
to Title VII by opponents of the legislation who hoped the amendment would 
defeat the legislation.
53
 Specifically, Representative Howard Smith, chairman 
of the House Rules Committee and a Southern congressman, proposed to 
include the term ―sex‖ the day before the act was passed.
54
 Although 
Representative Smith was hoping it would divide supporters of the bill,
55
 it 
instead produced ―an unholy alliance between feminists and segregationists‖
56
 
because it triggered the contention that without the amendment, the bill would 
protect black women but not white women.
57
 Despite the near accidental 
origins of sex as a protected characteristic under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it 
                                                          
47. Civil Rights Act of 1963, H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. (1963). 
48. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 
(June 19, 1963), available at Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9283. 
49. Adam W. Aston, Note, ―Fair and Full Employment‖: Forty Years of Unfulfilled Promises, 15 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 285, 288 (2004). 
50. Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After Forty Years: The 
Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 944 (2005); see also CHARLES WHALEN & 
BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
(1985) [hereinafter WHALEN & WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE]. 
51. See Aston, supra note 49, at 289-92. 
52. Deborah N. McFarland, Beyond Sex Discrimination: A Proposal for Federal Sexual 
Harassment Legislation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 501 (1996). 
53. 110 CONG. REC. 2, 577 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Smith on February 8, 1964 
proposing to add the word ―sex‖ to Title VII); see also WHALEN & WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE, 
supra note 50, at 115-118, 234 (―[C]overage [of women] in H.R. 7152 did not come about through 
strenuous lobbying by women‘s groups; it was the result of a deliberate ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle 
it.‖). 
54. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1991). 
55. McFarland, supra note 52, at 502. 
56. Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of 
Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755, 769 (2004). 
57. Id. at 770-772. 
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was the ―first piece of major civil rights legislation to protect the rights of 
women.‖
58
 
Despite the success in enacting Title VII, the statute as originally enacted 
contained significant limitations. First, although Title VII prohibited both 
private and public employers from intentionally discriminating on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, the statute defined the term 
―employer‖ narrowly and excluded businesses with fewer than twenty-five 
employees.
59
 Eight years later, Congress passed the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act,
60
 lowering the statutory minimum number of employees from 
twenty-five to fifteen.
61
 Section 1981 does not require a minimum number of 
employees as a prerequisite to coverage,
62
 and many arguments have been 
made to encourage the repeal of this portion of Title VII.
63
 
More importantly, Title VII granted victims of discrimination a private 
right of action against their employers, but the right was not unlimited. First, a 
prevailing party under Title VII was not initially entitled to compensatory or 
punitive damages.
64
 Instead, when Title VII originally was enacted, a 
prevailing party was only entitled to recover equitable remedies such as 
backpay, injunctive relief, and reinstatement.
65
 
Perhaps the greatest weakness of Title VII, however, was that it failed to 
define certain key terms including ―discrimination‖
66
 and ―sex.‖
67
 In 1965, the 
EEOC responded to ―the unexpectedly high number of sexual discrimination 
charges filed in [Title VII‘s] first year‖ by issuing guidelines to define the 
concept of sex discrimination.
68
 Almost immediately, lawsuits were filed in 
federal court challenging the meaning of these terms.
69
 The circumstances 
                                                          
58. See CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 732 (4th ed. 
2006); Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the 
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 432-33 (2005). 
59. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 253-254 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1964)). 
60. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2(4), 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e (b) (1976)). 
61. The Act also expanded the EEOC‘s enforcement powers to include filing its own lawsuits. Id. 
at §§ 4-12. 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
63. See Aston, supra note 49, at 307-312 (discussing the arguments advanced during the 
Congressional debate in 1972 in support of the repeal of the employee minimum). 
64. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g) (1988)). 
65. Id. 
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e (1964)) (defining key terms in the statute but lacking a definition for ―discrimination‖ or ―sex‖). 
67. Id. 
68. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 671, 675 (2005). 
69. See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and 
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 409-434 (1995) (exploring the various theoretical approaches to the term 
―discrimination‖). 
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under which ―sex‖ was added to the statute, however, did not provide much 
legislative history to assist courts with its meaning.
70
 
While the statute clearly prohibited certain tangible employment actions 
such as termination and refusal to hire and promote,
71
 litigants also challenged 
the more ambiguous language prohibiting discrimination in ―other terms and 
conditions of employment.‖
72
 Here again, African-Americans led the reform 
effort and filed suits challenging conduct amounting to racial harassment.
73
 
Courts generally were willing to recognize that racial harassment amounted to 
discrimination because of race,
74
 but they initially refused to recognize that 
sexual harassment amounted to discrimination because of sex.
75
 Federal courts 
advanced different theories to justify the dismissal of those sexual harassment 
suits, but the predominant theory was that sexual harassment involved 
―personal urge[s]‖ and ―proclivit[ies]‖
76
 and that the victim‘s sex was ―merely 
incidental to the harassment.‖
77
 
                                                          
70. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
71. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964)). 
72. Id. 
73. See Pat K. Chew, Seeing Subtle Racism, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183, 184-186 (2010) 
(discussing the early cases asserting claims of racial harassment and stating that the first federal court to 
recognize the claim did so in 1969); Colleen M. Davenport, Sexual Harassment Under Title VII: 
Equality in the Workplace or Second-Class Status?: Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 10 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 193, 208-210 (1987) (tracing the recognition of racial, religious, and national origin harassment 
claims under Title VII); Susan M. Matthews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages 
Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 299, 305-307 (1991) (comparing the success of racial harassment 
with sexual harassment and finding that Section 1981 has traditionally afforded victims of racial 
discrimination the opportunity to seek compensatory and punitive damages); Kathleen A. Smith, 
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under Title VII, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 252 
(1987) (discussing the inherent differences in a claim of race and religion harassment with a sexual 
harassment claim and how those differences contributed somewhat to the refusal to recognize the claim 
in some of the early cases). 
74. See generally sources cited supra note 73. 
75. See ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01 at 2-
4, 2-10 -2-20 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing federal cases refusing to recognize a cause of action for sexual 
harassment); McFarland, supra note 52, at 508 n.83 (citing cases dismissing a claim of sexual 
harassment); Julianne Scott, Pragmatism, Feminist Theory, and the Reconceptualization of Sexual 
Harassment, 10 UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J. 203, 208-210 (1999) (discussing the holdings in the first cases 
that refused to recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination and examining how these 
holdings influenced several leading feminists and their arguments). 
76. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 
(9th Cir. 1977); see also Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F.Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) 
(―[Title VII] is not intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical attack 
motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate 
corridor rather than a back alley‖), rev’d and remanded, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of 
Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (―It is conceivable, under plaintiff‘s theory, that flirtations 
of the smallest order would give rise to liability. The attraction of males to females and females to males 
is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most 
personnel decisions‖), rev’d and remanded, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); accord Katherine M. Franke, 
What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 698-701 (1997) (exploring the early 
sexual harassment cases in which courts dismissed the claim as ―an [e]xpression of [p]rivate, [p]ersonal 
[s]exual [d]esire‖). 
77. McFarland, supra note 52, at 508; see also Katherine H. Flynn, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment:  
Sex, Gender and the Definition of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 
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In 1976, a federal court held for the first time that sexual harassment 
constituted sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.
78
 Shortly 
thereafter, several other federal circuit courts issued similar decisions 
recognizing claims of sexual harassment, but federal courts were by no means 
uniform in their justifications or conclusions.
79
 Legal scholars credit several 
feminists, including Catharine MacKinnon, Lin Farley, and Carroll Brodsky,
80
 
as the impetus that created the ―quiet revolution in sexual harassment law.‖
81
 
Even the Supreme Court later relied on MacKinnon‘s theories
82
 in its landmark 
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, when it confirmed for the first time 
that sexual harassment is a type of sex discrimination under Title VII.
83
 
Despite the general recognition that sexual harassment was a valid claim 
under Title VII, it was clear by the 1980s that women who filed a lawsuit under 
Title VII achieved only a hollow victory.
84
 If a woman endured sexual 
harassment and resigned as a result, then she was entitled to recover back pay 
for a limited period of no more than two years or until she obtained similar 
employment.
85
 On the other hand, if a woman endured sexual harassment but 
                                                          
1103-04 (1997) (examining the various concerns advanced by the early courts when they refused to 
recognize sexual harassment claims). 
78. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). 
79. See CONTE, supra note 75, at 2-4. 
80. See CAROL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER (1976); LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL 
SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978); CATHARINE MACKINNON, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 59 (1979). 
81. Holly B. Fechner, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual Harassment Law 
and the Reconstruction of Fact, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 475, 477 (1990); see also Scott, supra note 75, at 
209. 
82. See Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The Challenges of Creating Sexual 
Harassment Protections for Prisons and Other Nonworkplace Settings, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) 
(―Modern workplace sexual harassment law would not exist as it does today were it not for Catharine 
MacKinnon‘s attempt to articulate a coherent theory of workplace sexual harassment in the 1970s, as her 
work unquestionably shaped federal courts‘ understanding of sexual harassment as a social problem.‖); 
Joanna P. L. Mangum, Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.: The Fourth Circuit’s ―Simple Logic‖ 
of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 76 N.C. L. REV. 306, 319 (1997) (―The judiciary 
followed [the] lead [of Professor MacKinnon], ultimately resulting in the Supreme Court‘s creation of a 
Title VII sexual harassment claim.‖). 
83. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (using the same framework when 
discussing sexual harassment as a valid claim under Title VII that Catherine MacKinnon proposed in her 
book); see also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (citing MacKinnon‘s 
work). 
84. See, e.g., Eleanore K. Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An Interdisciplinary Examination of 
Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M. L. REV. 91, 106-07 (1987) (arguing that Title 
VII should be amended to provide compensatory and punitive damages); Krista J. Schoenheider, A 
Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1462, 1472-
75 (1986) (discussing the remedial relief available to victims of sexual harassment under Title VII and 
stating that it is ―grossly inadequate‖). Even after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, some 
advocates continued to encourage claims under state law. See, e.g., Deborah S. Brenneman, Note, Sexual 
Harassment Claims and Ohio’s Workers’ Compensation Statute: Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 61 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1515, 1540-41 (1993) (―State tort law holds greater potential for providing more complete 
 recovery for sexual harassment victims.‖). 
85. See Christine O. Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual 
Harassment under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83, 103-113 (1984–85) (discussing the 
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remained on the job, then her recovery was limited to injunctive relief ordering 
the company to stop the harassment.
86
 Indeed, several sexual harassment 
lawsuits gained national attention during this time period for the atrocities and 
extended harassment suffered by women at the hands of their supervisors and 
co-workers.
87
 In one case, the district court described the sexual harassment 
endured by the plaintiff as ―sustained, malicious, and brutal harassment,‖
88
 and 
stated that it had occurred over a period of five years. The plaintiff, however, 
only recovered $2,763.20 in back pay to cover her salary while she took several 
short medical absences.
89
 Thus, many women elected not to pursue their claims 
of sexual harassment because, on one hand, they needed their jobs and feared 
they would suffer retaliation at work, and on the other hand, a successful 
lawsuit would not make them whole.
90
   
Also in the 1980s, the Supreme Court‘s composition shifted significantly to 
the right with a series of nominations by President Reagan.
91
 These personnel 
changes not only signaled the end of an era of judicial activism toward the 
advancement of civil rights, but also marked a period of judicial regression in 
which the Court ―significantly narrowed prior interpretations‖ of both § 1981 
and Title VII.
92
 In the 1988 to 1989 term, the Supreme Court issued six 
decisions that dramatically curtailed the scope of § 1981 and Title VII.
93
 Of 
particular relevance here, the Court held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 
that racial harassment is not a valid claim under § 1981, because § 1981 only 
                                                          
inadequacies of remedial relief in sexual harassment cases and arguing for the availability of 
compensatory and punitive damages); Schoenheider, supra note 84, at 1472-75 (discussing remedies  
awarded to victims of sexual harassment). 
86. See sources cited supra note 85. 
87. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., No. 85C1401, 1987 WL 61557 (N.D. Ill. 1987), rev’d 881 
F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F.Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
88. See Zabkowicz, 589 F. Supp. at 785. 
89. See Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., Div. of Dart Industries, Inc., 789 F.2d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
90. See, e.g., BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 47-48 (1985) (discussing the 
prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace and reporting fifty-three percent of women suffered 
sexual harassment); John W. Whitehead, Eleventh Hour Amendment or Serious Business: Sexual 
Harassment and the United States Supreme Court’s 1997-1998 Term, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 775-778 
(1998) (providing statistics documenting the pervasiveness of sexual harassment but documenting the 
psychological reasons that women fail to report it). 
91. These personnel changes on the Court included Justice O‘Connor‘s accession to Justice 
Stewart‘s seat in 1981, Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s replacement of Chief Justice Burger in 1986, Justice 
Scalia‘s appointment that same year, and Justice Kennedy‘s appointment in 1987. See Charles B. 
Craver, Radical Supreme Court Justices Endeavor to Rewrite the Civil Rights Statutes, 10 LAB. LAW. 
727, 727-28 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 31, at 624 n.62, 633 n.131. 
92. Drew S. Days, III, Civil Rights at the Crossroads, 1 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 29, 33 
(1992). 
93. See Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989); 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) 
(overruling Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989). 
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applies to the formation and enforcement of contracts and not to ―conditions of 
continuing employment.‖
94
 
After the Patterson decision, the viability of future harassment claims was 
in complete disarray. African-Americans could no longer bring a claim of racial 
harassment under § 1981.
95
 Although a claim for racial harassment was still 
viable under Title VII, that statute did not compensate successful litigants by 
awarding damages, and therefore many believed it was not as effective a 
deterrent to employers.
96
 The impact of the Patterson decision was immediate 
and severe, causing the dismissal of hundreds of claims pending in federal 
court and a sharp decline in claims filed under § 1981 the subsequent year.
97
 
This time, African-American leaders and feminists were united in their 
efforts to obtain congressional reform.
98
 African-American leaders primarily 
advocated the restoration of their rights to sue for harassment under § 1981, but 
they also supported the efforts of feminists to seek reform under Title VII.
99
 
Likewise, feminist leaders working through groups including the National 
Women‘s Law Center,
100
 the National Federation of Business and Professional 
                                                          
94. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171, 176-77. 
95. See Harvey L. Cohen, In the Wake of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The Treacherous and 
Shifting Shoals of Employment Discrimination Law, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 557 (1989) (discussing the 
Tenth Circuit‘s application of Patterson to specific cases pending prior to the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991). 
96. See Woody W. Lay, Note, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: A Narrowing of Remedies for the 
Employment Discrimination Plaintiff, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 995, 999 (1990) (discussing the 
advantages, including the availability of damages, to filing suit under Section 1981 rather than Title 
VII). 
97. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., THE IMPACT OF PATTERSON V. MCLEAN 
CREDIT UNION 4 (1989) (estimating that in four and one-half months since the Supreme Court issued its 
Patterson decision, more than ninety-six cases were dismissed in the lower courts and predicting 
continued dismissals at a similar rate); Kelly J. Andrews, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The 
Deconstruction of a Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Statute, 35 HOW. L.J. 403, 431 n.163 (1992) 
(discussing the ―devastating‖ effects of the Patterson decision and the dismissal of lawsuits filed under 
Section 1981); William B. Gould, IV, Symposium, The United States Supreme Court’s 1988 Term Civil 
Rights Cases, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and 
Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1485, 1506 & n.99 (1990) (―[M]any courts have jumped with  
alacrity to dismiss claims without even consideration of oral argument‖). 
98. See Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground:  The Conflict 
Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 35-36 
(1993) (documenting that the Women‘s Legal Defense Fund and the National Women‘s Law Center 
proposed the plan to equalize damages under Title VII and § 1981 and NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund ―immediately embraced the proposal because it stripped a federal judiciary . . . of its 
exclusive role as fact-finder in employment discrimination cases under Title VII‖). 
99. See, e.g., Vol. I, infra note 115, at 430, 465 (testimony of William T. Coleman, Jr., Chairman of 
the Board of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.) (advocating the reversal of Patterson 
and the availability of full compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII); Vol. I, infra note 115, at 
268, 271 (testimony of Marcia D. Greenberger, Managing Attorney, National Women‘s Law Center) 
(arguing for the same, but focusing on the availability of damages under Title VII because that is really 
―[w]hat is at issue in this legislation‖); see infra notes 104, 120, 122-125, 127, 174-176 and 
accompanying text. 
100. See Vol. I, infra note 115, at 268 (testimony of Marcia D. Greenberger). 
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Women‘s Clubs, Inc.,
101
 and People for the American Way
102
 lobbied Congress 
for a damages scheme under Title VII that was equal to the damages scheme 
under § 1981. These women emphasized the growing problem of sexual 
harassment in the workforce, the inadequacies of Title VII‘s current remedial 
scheme to make victims whole and deter employers‘ wrongful conduct, and the 
inequities of pursuing claims under Title VII rather than § 1981. In short, by 
uniting their efforts, both groups succeeded in raising national awareness of the 
harassment crisis and mounted an impressive campaign that urged Congress to 
reform both laws. 
Ultimately, Congress acquiesced to the reform requested by the African-
American community, and it amended the text of § 1981 to include a cause of 
action for harassment, thus restoring the rights removed by the Court‘s 
Patterson decision.
103
 In fact, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991demonstrates very little Congressional debate surrounding the proposed 
amendment to the text of § 1981.
104
 Both President Bush and the Democrat-
controlled Congress disagreed with the Court‘s decision in Patterson and 
supported this portion of the amendment.
105
 Thus, there was virtually no debate 
between the two parties over this issue. 
On the other hand, the damages reform advocated by women to Title VII 
caused sharp dissension and controversy. As documented in the legislative 
history section of this article, numerous days of testimony before congressional 
committees and subcommittees were devoted to the problem of sexual 
harassment and the inadequacies of remedies available to women under Title 
VII. Yet despite this convincing testimony, congressional leaders in both 
                                                          
101. See Vol. II, infra note 115, at 708-722 (supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
102. See Vol. I, infra note 135, at 131. 
103. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 1, at § 101 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reads as follows: 
Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1981) is amended – 
by inserting ―(a)‖ before ―All persons within‖; and 
by adding at the end the following new subsections: 
―(b)  For purposes of this section, the term ‗make and enforce contracts‘ includes the making, 
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, 
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 
(c)The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongonvernmental 
discrimination and impairment under color of State law.‖ 
104. See Vol. I, infra note 115, at 268 (testimony of Marcia D. Greenberger, Managing Attorney, 
National Women‘s Law Center) (―It was very heartening to hear the expressions of support that seem 
quite unanimous, in fact, with respect to overruling the Patterson case. . . .‖). 
105. See Caroline R. Fredrickson, The Misreading of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The 
Diminishing Scope of Section 1981, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 902-903 (1991) (―The view that Patterson 
should be overruled, though, seems not to have been an issue of dispute, as the President‘s own alternate 
sought to overrule it as well.‖) (citing President‘s Civil Rights Act, S. 3239, 101st Cong. § 11, 136 
CONG. REC. 18,048 (1990); accord Sheilah A. Goodman, Trying to Undo the Damage: The Civil Rights 
Act of 1990, 14 HARV. WOMEN‘S L.J. 185, 208 (1991) (agreeing that President Bush supported 
legislative action to overturn the Patterson decision but explaining that he initially favored a more 
limited interpretation of Section 1981 that would ―extend[] coverage only to claims of harassment that 
would constitute a violation of state contract law‖ (internal citation omitted)). 
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houses of Congress exchanged sharp words of disagreement over the scope of 
damages that should be afforded to victims of sex discrimination. This included 
the testimony of several witnesses who offered discriminatory justifications for 
the availability of only limited damages to victims of sex discrimination, 
including the view that sex discrimination was an unavoidable ―social 
problem.‖ Given the inevitability of flirtations between men and women in the 
workplace, some Republican congressional leaders expressed the concern that 
providing women with unlimited tort damages would ―open the floodgates‖ and 
overburden the federal courts with sexual harassment claims. After more than 
two years of debate, the Civil Rights Act that was enacted and signed by 
President Bush in 1991 fell far short of the damages reform requested by 
feminists. Rather than equalizing the remedies between § 1981 and Title VII, it 
created a two-tier damage structure that discriminates against women. Now, let 
us reexamine the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by focusing 
on the political debate over the availability of remedies under Title VII and 
revealing the discriminatory justifications advanced for limiting recovery to 
victims of sex discrimination. 
II. THE ART OF COMPROMISE: PROBING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
THAT FORGED THE DAMAGES PROVISION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1991 
As documented in numerous sources, the enactment of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 was not an easy task. It required two legislative efforts and was 
achieved only after the first attempt, the Civil Rights Act of 1990, was vetoed 
by President Bush. Yet prior scholarship has provided only limited treatment of 
the internal battle raging within Congress over whether victims of sex 
discrimination should be granted equal remedies to those granted to victims of 
race discrimination. During both legislative attempts, Congress heard testimony 
and acknowledged the unequal rights of women imposed by the limited and 
inadequate equitable remedies then available under Title VII.  Yet despite this 
inequality, Congress subrogated the rights of women by adopting a damages 
regime that placed caps on the damages available to victims of sex 
discrimination while affording unlimited damages to victims of race 
discrimination.  As revealed by the legislative history, Congress knew that the 
caps on damages devalued claims of sex discrimination, but nonetheless 
sacrificed equality for the sake of political compromise. Despite the 
significance of Congress‘ decision to knowingly abdicate its duty to advance 
equality, this is a neglected aspect of the legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act and provides an additional basis for advocating the repeal of this 
discriminatory remedial scheme. Let us now separately examine the legislative 
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history of the 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts as it pertains to the availability 
of damages. 
A. The Failed Attempt to Resist Compromise: The Civil Rights Act of 
1990 
On February 7, 1990, Senator Kennedy and Representative Hawkins 
simultaneously introduced identical versions of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in 
both the Senate
106
 and the House of Representatives.
107
 This initial version of 
the Kennedy-Hawkins bill was ambitious, and boldly declared in its findings 
that ―existing protections and remedies under Federal law are not adequate to 
deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate victims of such 
discrimination.‖
108
 As originally proposed, Section 8 of the Kennedy-Hawkins 
bill permitted unlimited compensatory and punitive damages against 
nongovernmental employers for acts of intentional discrimination.
109
 It also 
specifically provided for trial by jury in accordance with the dictates of the 
Seventh Amendment.
110
 Despite the broad reforms sought by the Kennedy-
Hawkins bill, it garnered significant support from its inception in both 
Congressional houses as it was introduced with a large number of co-sponsors 
to convey strong commitment to the act.
111
 
Approximately two weeks later, Senator Hatch introduced President 
Bush‘s initial civil rights bill, which proposed only limited reforms.
112
 
Although the President‘s bill amended § 1981 to restore racial harassment 
claims and overturn the Supreme Court‘s decision in Patterson, it did not 
amend Title VII‘s remedial scheme.
113
 Thus, ―[t]he administration immediately 
found itself in a vulnerable position with respect to the sexual harassment 
issue,‖ and the President‘s bill largely was disregarded.
114
 
                                                          
106. 136 CONG. REC. 1,600, 1,653 (1990) (introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in the Senate). 
107. 136 CONG. REC. 1,550 (1990) (introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in the House). 
108. S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 2 (1990) (§ 2(a)(2) of S. 2104); H.R. REP. NO. 101-644, pt. 1, at 3 
(1990) (§ 2(a)(2) of H.R. 4000). 
109. S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 4 (1990) (§ 8 of S. 2104); H.R. REP. NO. 101-644, pt. 1, at 5, 6 (1990) 
(§ 8 of H.R. 4000). 
110. S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 55 (1990). 
111. See 136 CONG. REC. 1,600, 1,653 (1990) (when introduced by Senator Kennedy on Feb. 7, 
1990, the bill listed 34 cosponsors); 136 CONG. REC. 1,550 (1990) (when introduced by Representative 
Hawkins on Feb. 7, 1990, the bill listed 122 cosponsors, and 56 additional sponsors were added on May 
16, 1990); see also Govan, supra note 98, at 50, 51. 
112. 136 CONG. REC. 2,402 (1990) (Senator Hatch introduced the administration‘s bill, entitled the 
―Civil Rights Protections Act of 1990,‖ and this version of the bill was endorsed by other key 
Republican senators including Senator Coats, Senator Dole, Senator Kasten, and Senator Thurmond). 
113. Id. 
114. See Roger Clegg, Symposium, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1464 (1994). 
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Five congressional hearings were held to consider the Civil Rights Act of 
1990 during the 101st Congress.
115
 The initial hearings held in the House of 
Representatives focused largely on the damages provision found in Section 8 of 
the Kennedy-Hawkins bill.
116
 The first hearing was held in February, just two 
weeks after the Kennedy-Hawkins bill was introduced.
117
 Much of the 
testimony during this hearing advocated the availability of compensatory and 
punitive damages to victims of sex discrimination under Title VII, enumerating 
several justifications. 
First, numerous witnesses at the February hearing asserted that the lack of 
damages under Title VII constituted discrimination against women and 
advocated that Title VII be amended and modeled after the remedies afforded 
to victims under § 1981. For instance, David Rose, the former Chief of 
Employment Litigation at the U.S. Department of Justice, acknowledged that 
―[t]here is a strong element of unfairness in the present law and . . . that is that 
purposeful discrimination is actionable under 1981 if the discrimination is on 
grounds of race or national origin and it is not for grounds of sex 
discrimination.‖
118
 Additionally, John E. Jacob, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the National Urban League, testified that a refusal to afford equal 
remedies to women ―would, in itself, be discriminatory, a way of saying that 
                                                          
115. Four hearings were held in the House of Representatives during the 101st Congress. See 
Hearings on H.R. 4000, The Civil Rights Act of 1990–Volume 1: Joint Hearings Before the Comm. on 
Education and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990) (hearings were held on Feb. 20 and 27, 1990) [hereinafter Vol. I]; 
Hearings on H.R. 4000, The Civil Rights Act of 1990–Volume 2: Joint Hearings Before the Comm. on 
Education and Labor and the S. Comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990) (hearing was held on March 13 and 20, 1990) [hereinafter Vol. II); 
Hearings on H.R. 4000, The Civil Rights Act of 1990–Volume 3: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 101st Cong. (1990) (hearings were held on April 25 and May 21, 1990) 
[hereinafter Vol. III] and Hearings on H.R. 4000, Civil Rights in the Work Force: Hearings Before the 
H. Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong. (1990) (hearings were held on July 30, 1990). 
One published hearing was held in the Senate during that time. See Hearings on S. 2104, The Civil 
Rights Act of 1990: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990) 
(held on Feb. 23 and 27, Mar. 1 and 7, 1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]. 
116. Section 8 of the Kennedy-Hawkins bill stated in its entirety: 
SEC. 8.  PROVIDING FOR DAMAGES IN CASE OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION. 
Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)) is amended by inserting before 
the last sentence the following new sentences: ‗With respect to an unlawful employment practice other 
than an unlawful employment practice established in accordance with section 703(k)) — 
(A) Compensatory damages may be awarded; and 
If the respondent (other than a government, government agency, or a  political subdivision) engaged in 
the unlawful employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others, punitive damages may be awarded against such respondent; 
In addition to the relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this subsection, except that 
compensatory damages shall not include backpay or any interest thereon.  If compensatory or punitive 
damages are sought with respect to a claim arising under this title, any party may demand a trial by 
jury.‘ 
S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 8 (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong. § 8 (1990). 
117. See Vol. I, supra note 115. 
118. See Vol. I, supra note 115, at 716 (testimony of David Rose). 
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discrimination is a minor misdemeanor, like a parking ticket.‖
119
 Other 
advocates urged support for the bill on similar grounds.
120
 
Second, witnesses testified that the remedial scheme under Title VII was 
inadequate to compensate victims of sex discrimination. Chairman of the 
House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights Don Edwards 
explained in his opening remarks at the hearings in February that the damages 
provision was ―need[ed] to put teeth in Title VII, to serve as a deterrent to 
violators, and to give victims of discrimination a proper remedy.‖
121
 Other 
witnesses testified that the remedial relief afforded by Title VII could prove 
―woefully inadequate‖ to many victims of discrimination
122
 because it ―fail[ed] 
to provide employers with a meaningful incentive to comply with the law,‖
123
 
impaired the attainment of Title VII‘s dual purposes to ―eliminate[e] effects of 
past discrimination and . . . prevent[] future discrimination,‖
124
 and deterred 
women from filing suit.
125
 In the view of these witnesses, Title VII remedies 
imposed unequal redress for victims,
126
 and the witnesses urged that women 
should be entitled to ―comparable remedies.‖
127
 
                                                          
119. In that same portion of his testimony, Mr. Jacob predicted that opponents of the legislation 
might try to weaken the damages provision in the bill and encouraged Congress to resist those pressures, 
stating any limits would be unfair: 
I‘m also concerned that attempts will be made to dilute provisions of the bill that provide adequate relief 
to victims of discrimination.  It seems to me that when the judicial system finds that someone is wrong, 
they should receive just compensation.  In those cases where the courts find gross intentional violations 
of rights that warrant punitive damages, such punishment should be enforced. 
Those means of redress are embedded in our justice system and commonly applied to other forms of 
victimization.  To refuse to apply them to the bitter wrongs of discrimination would, in itself, be 
discriminatory, a way of saying that discrimination is a minor misdemeanor, like a parking ticket. 
Id. at 591. 
120. See id. at 271 (testimony of Marcia D. Greenberger, Managing Attorney for the National 
Women‘s Law Center) (calling the lack of damages remedy in Title VII a ―glaring omission‖ and urging 
Congress to enact the ―long overdue‖ bill); id. at 565 (testimony of John J. Curtin, Jr., President of the 
American Bar Association) (testifying in support of providing unlimited damages to victims of 
discrimination under Title VII and explaining that the bill ―does for women what for years has been 
done for racial discrimination‖); id. at 580-81 (statement of Norman Dorsen, President of the American 
Civil Liberties Union) (explaining that he supported the damages provision in the bill because it 
―resolves an anomaly‖ in employment law which allows these remedies for cases of racial 
discrimination, but denies them to women and others). 
121. See Vol. I, supra note 115, at 429 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights). 
122. Id. at 277 (testimony of Ms. Greenberger). 
123. Id. at 280; see also id. at 533 (statement of Mr. John J. Curtin, Jr.). 
124. Id. at 280. 
125. Id. at 279. 
126. Id. at 133 (statement of John H. Buchanan, Jr., Chairman, People for the American Way); see 
also id. at 613 (statement of Antonia Hernandez, President and Counsel of the Mexican-American Legal 
Defense Fund) (testifying that ―what one can hope for is to provide to women the opportunity to file [for 
compensatory and punitive damages].  It makes no sense for a black woman to be able to file under 1981 
and to have a white woman not be able to file‖). 
127. See id. at 282 (statement of Ms. Greenberger) (summarizing findings of a report prepared by 
the National Women‘s Law Center titled Title VII’s Failed Promise: The Impact of the Lack of a 
Damages Remedy, which explored, among other things, the remedies recovered by women who turned 
to state tort law to pursue their sex discrimination claims. The report concluded that ―[s]tate law does not 
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Finally, some of the testimony emphasized the pervasive problem of sexual 
harassment in the workplace and demonstrated how Title VII‘s equitable 
remedies were particularly inadequate for these victims. For example, the 
report submitted by the National Women‘s Law Center documented that 
―[s]exual harassment is a severe problem for a large percentage of women.‖
128
 
The report also ―chronicle[d] case after case in which courts have found in 
reported decisions that individuals have been discriminated against by their 
employers, and yet the victims have gotten minimal or no relief under Title 
VII.‖
129
 After listening to testimony related to this report, Representative 
Hawkins concluded that the lack of a damages remedy for victims of sex 
discrimination was inherently unfair because such victims could suffer ―severe 
damages as a result of being harassed on the job,‖ including ―physical damage 
for the rest of [their] life,‖ but would have ―no remedy.‖
130
 
Joint hearings again were held on March 13 and 20, 1990, before the 
House Committee on Education and Labor and the Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights.
131
 Although much testimony was given during the 
February hearings that related to damages, the focus on damages at the March 
hearings was even greater and focused almost exclusively on the need for 
providing damages to victims of sex discrimination. These hearings began with 
powerful testimony from two victims of sexual harassment, Carol Zabkowicz
132
 
and Helen Brooms,
133
 who shared their personal experiences involving 
egregious and prolonged harassment from their employers.  Both women urged 
Congress to amend Title VII to provide for damages and advanced two 
rationales, namely that Title VII‘s provisions did not make them whole
134
 and 
                                                          
provide a sufficient alternative [because] state tort laws typically include requirements which are 
extremely difficult to satisfy, and many victims are barred by state worker‘s compensation laws from 
suing their employers in tort altogether.‖). 
128. Id. at 273. 
129. Id. at 277. 
130. Id. at 418; see also id. at 716 (testimony of David Rose, former Chief, Employment Litigation 
of the U.S. Department of Justice) (explaining that the equitable remedies in Title VII were particularly 
problematic in cases of sexual harassment because ―there is no relationship whatsoever between the 
injury that the employee or applicant suffers and the back pay‖). 
131. See Vol. II, supra note 115. 
132. See Vol. II, supra note 115, at 2–11 (statement of Carol Zabkowicz) (testifying that she 
endured more than five years of ―sustained‖ harassment at the hands of co-workers and supervisors, that 
the harassment harmed her health, and that her recovery was limited to $2,700 in backpay). 
133. See Vol. II, supra note 115, at 12–18 (statement of Helen Brooms) (describing brutal and 
graphic acts of harassment at the hands of her supervisor, including threats if she did not sleep with him, 
and a fall down a flight of stairs when she tried to escape him during an encounter. Brooms suffered 
physical damage and ―spent eight weeks in traction.‖ Her recovery also was limited to backpay.). 
134. See id. at 4 (testimony of Ms. Zabkowicz) (stating that ―Title VII is supposed to make victims 
whole for the harm they have suffered because of discrimination. I was not made whole. Not only did I 
have to pay a lot of medical bills and suffer a great deal of medical harm because of the harassment, but 
I was robbed of my dignity. Today, in 1990, several years after leaving West Bend, I am finding the 
healing process is far from over.‖); see also id. at 14 (statement of Ms. Brooms) (explaining that she 
testified ―for myself and for all the women who continue to be victimized on the job, to a large degree as 
a result of the fact that the law, by limiting our real damages, encourages management to permit 
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that damages would increase employer incentives to ―take the law more 
seriously.‖
135
 
Reinforcing a position that numerous witnesses made in the February 
hearings, witnesses in the March hearings also offered testimony declaring that 
remedial remedies for victims of sex discrimination under Title VII were 
inadequate. First, some witnesses explained that equitable remedies fail to deter 
employer misconduct
136
 because they amount to nothing more than ―a slap on 
the wrist.‖
137
 Others explained that equitable remedies simply encourage 
employer enforcement of Title VII, which was much like ―having the wolf 
watch the chicken coop.‖
138
 In response to this testimony, several Congressmen 
argued that without the possibility of damages, ―there is no hammer out there to 
put over their heads, [and] then we are whistling Dixie.‖
139
 Finally, other 
supporters expressed that the only deterrence afforded by equitable remedies 
was to deter victims from bringing suit because the remedies did not ―come 
close to making whole the woman‖
140
 and they reinforced the ―grin and bear 
it‖
141
 tendency of many victims. In short, Representative Washington declared 
that if damages ―prevent[ed] one [woman] from being subjected to 
[harassment],‖ then they should be made available under Title VII.
142
 
Several witnesses testifying at the March hearings also attempted to justify 
the expansion of remedies under Title VII by comparing the statute with 
existing causes of action at common law in which similar remedies already 
were available. For instance, several witnesses compared a claim of 
employment discrimination to various intentional torts including battery under 
state law.
143
 Theodore Eisenberg, a professor at Cornell Law School, explained 
that employment discrimination claims qualified as intentional torts.
144
 He also 
discussed the remedies for intentional torts at common law and stated that 
                                                          
violations of the law‖); see also id. at 12 (testimony of Ms. Brooms) (explaining that she agreed to 
testify because she ―fel[t] strongly that women who are victimized by sexual harassment and other forms 
of discrimination on the job must obtain fair damages and redress. . . . I agreed to testify so that other 
women in this country who are also brutalized on the job may, in the future, have a remedy which 
compensates them for their pain and exploitation.‖). 
135. Id. at 4 (testimony of Ms. Zabkowicz); see also id. at 14 (testimony of Ms. Brooms) 
(explaining that she was speaking out  ―to a large degree as a result of the fact that the law, by limiting 
our real damages, encourages management to permit violations of the law‖). 
136. See id. at 51, 54 (testimony of Ms. Nancy Kreiter, Research Director, Women Employed 
Institute); id. at 181 (testimony of William Burns, Pacific Gas & Electric); id. at 710 (prepared statement 
of National Federal of Business and Professional Women‘s Clubs, Inc.); id. at 851 (prepared statement 
of Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Vice President, Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association). 
137. Id. at 21 (testimony of Ms. Nancy Kreiter). 
138. Id. at 68 (statement of Rep. Payne, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). 
139. Id. at 185 (statement of Rep. Washington, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). 
140. Id. at 191 (testimony of Jane Lang, attorney, Sprenger and Lang). 
141. Id. at 69 (statement of Rep. Payne, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). 
142. Id. at 75 (statement of Rep. Washington, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). 
143. See id. at 136 (testimony of Theodore Eisenberg, Professor, Cornell Law School); id. at 73 
(statement of Rep. Washington, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). 
144. See id. at 136 (testimony of Mr. Eisenberg). 
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―[t]he thought of my not getting compensatory or punitive damages is simply 
unheard of.‖
145
 Other witnesses relied on the remedies available under other 
federal statutes and noted that these other statutes afforded more complete 
relief than the remedial structure of Title VII. For instance, some witnesses 
relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
146
 and noted that compensatory and punitive 
damages were available to plaintiffs under that statute, including to victims of 
employment discrimination against certain governmental employers.
147
 Others 
emphasized that victims of age discrimination could recover liquidated 
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
148
 which consisted 
of doubling the amount of actual damages for willful violations,
149
 and 
considered this remedial scheme a substantial improvement over the equitable 
remedies available under Title VII.
150
 
However, most witnesses compared the purposes of Title VII with those of 
§ 1981.
151
 This is not surprising given that the Civil Rights Act of 1990 
proposed to amend both statutes to ―restor[e] the civil rights protections that 
were dramatically limited by [the Supreme Court‘s recent decisions.]‖
152
 
Some Republicans, however, opposed the comparison of remedies under § 
1981 with Title VII and advanced three main theories to argue that the claims 
                                                          
145. Id. (comparing the unavailability of remedies under Title VII with the remedies available for 
other intentional torts and stating that employment discrimination ―is a legal wrong . . . which in 
remedies is discriminated against by our legal system. That is, the victims of discrimination are 
themselves discriminated against by the set of laws we have on the books now‖); see also id. at 143 
(prepared statement of Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab) (arguing that ―Title VII is one of the few 
areas of law in which the victim of an acknowledged intentional wrong cannot recover effective 
damages . . . . Whatever one thinks of compensatory and punitive damages in doctrinal areas involving 
behavior other than intentional wrongdoing, defendants who commit intentional torts under state law 
would be laughed out of state legislatures and Congress if they argued that they should not be liable for 
the full range of traditional compensatory and punitive damages.‖). 
146. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
147. See Vol. II, supra note 145, at 149 (prepared statement of Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart 
Schwab). 
148. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006). 
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (limiting the recovery of liquidated damages to ―cases of willful 
violations of this chapter‖). 
150. See Vol. II, supra note 115, at 179 (testimony of Victor Schachter, attorney, Schachter, 
Kristoff, Ross, Sprague & Curiale) (discussing the liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA and how 
employers ―take it extremely seriously‖). 
151. See id. at 77 (testimony of William Burns, consultant with Pacific Gas & Electric); id. at 137 
(testimony of Theodore Eisenberg); id. at 149 (prepared statement of Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart 
Schwab); id. at 186-87 (statement of Rep. Washington); id. at 716-17, 730 (prepared testimony of 
National Federation of Business and Professional Women‘s Clubs, Inc.). 
152. S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(1) (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong. § 2(b)(1) (1990). 
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should remain distinct.
153
 First, they argued that Title VII and § 1981 were 
inapposite given that § 1981 originally was not enacted as a labor law.
154
  
Second, while Republicans supported the amendment of § 1981 to restore racial 
harassment claims after the Supreme Court‘s decision in Patterson,
155
 they 
distinguished the substance of a claim of racial harassment from a claim of 
sexual harassment. For instance, attorney Glen D. Nager testified that sexual 
harassment was a ―social problem‖ and, therefore, ―an administratively 
imposed fine . . . is the more rational way of dealing with this specific 
problem.‖
156
 Similarly, attorney Ralph Baxter explained that sexual harassment 
was a more difficult problem to eradicate from the workplace than racial 
harassment because sexual harassment ―derives not only from gender-based 
thinking . . . it also derives from forms of social behavior. . . . It is more 
complicated than just bias. It is sexual in nature, and it makes it a harder 
problem to deal with. . . . ―
157
 Finally, opponents of the bill expressed concern 
                                                          
153. A third round of hearings was held on April 25, 1990 and May 21, 1990. The Republicans 
requested this third round of hearings and it largely explored their views and theories contending that a 
damages remedy was not necessary under Title VII. See Vol. III, supra note 115. Only a small part of 
this hearing consisted of testimony related to damages, and whenever possible, parallel citations to both 
Volume II and III will be provided for the Republican position. 
154. See Vol. II, supra note 115, at 88 (testimony of Victor Schachter); see also Vol. III, supra note 
154, at 3-4, 15 (testimony and prepared statement of Edward E. Potter, President, National Foundation 
for the Study of Employment Policies); id. at 438 (prepared statement of Linda Ottinger Headley, 
attorney, Hutcheson & Grundy). 
155. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
156. See Vol. II, supra note 115, at 630 (testimony of Glen D. Nager, attorney, Jones, Day, Reavis 
& Pogue). 
157. Id. at 55-58 (testimony of Ralph Baxter, attorney, Orrick, Herrington, Sutcliffe). Mr. Baxter 
also testified as follows: 
 
Mr. Baxter.  [S]exual harassment in the work place is much harder to control because it derives not just 
from the thinking, not just from the bigotry or the bias or the other things that drive other forms of 
discrimination, it derives from the sexual drives and other biological human drives of the people 
involved. It‘s a different kind of problem, and it‘s a harder one to deal with. . . . 
Mr. Miller.  Why? 
Mr. Baxter.  Because it is social as well as intellectual. It is a different kind of problem. 
Mr. Miller.  You‘re not answering the question.  Why? 
Mr. Baxter.  I‘m trying to.  Why is it? 
Mr. Miller. Explain to me why this thing that you now say is cultural, intellectual and social might be 
different than racism.  What is it about racism that makes it distinguishable from this?  It‘s not social?  
It‘s not intellectual?  It‘s not cultural?  People don‘t carry it into the workplace? 
. . . 
Mr. Baxter. . . . The reason is there‘s a spectrum of intersexual, interpersonal relations from flirtation to 
offense and lots of place in between and beyond. . . . Men and women employees in the work place are 
going to flirt.  They are going to have interchanges. It‘s going to happen. We‘re never going to legislate 
that away. . . . 
Mr. Miller.  How is that different than when activity based upon race runs that same spectrum? 
Mr. Baxter.  I find it hard to accept that people, good naturedly, in a good-natured way – . . . you‘re 
going to involve racial activity. 
. . . 
Mr. Miller.  You find it hard to believe what? . . . That you good naturedly could offend somebody 
based upon racial activity? . . . But in good humor you could fail to offend somebody sexually? So good 
humor is a defense? Who are you, Andy Rooney? 
FINAL ZEHRT MACROED (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2014  12:50 PM 
2014] Twenty Years of Compromise 271 
 
that extending compensatory and punitive damages to claims of discrimination 
would ―open the floodgates‖ of litigation in federal courts.
158
 
In contrast to Republican witnesses, civil rights leaders and feminists 
defended the comparison of Title VII with § 1981. They emphasized that the 
comparison was entirely appropriate because the most common allegation at 
that time under § 1981‘s provisions was an employment discrimination claim 
on the basis of race.
159
 Other witnesses disputed the argument that punitive 
damages would open the ―floodgates‖ of sexual discrimination claims by 
offering empirical evidence that very few verdicts under § 1981 resulted in 
million-dollar awards and that ―the median award for both compensatory and 
punitive damages under § 1981 has been less than $40,000 per case.‖
160
 
Finally, some witnesses relied on the results achieved by the availability of 
punitive damages under § 1981 and noted that while it did ―not necessarily . . . 
change people‘s attitudes . . . there have been all kinds of advances in the South 
where there was racial discrimination.‖
161
 So, while it ―didn‘t change peoples[‘] 
attitudes necessarily . . . the possibility of punitive [damages] certainly changed 
the behavior.‖
162
 
The most explosive testimony during the March hearings, however, was 
delivered by witnesses who believed that the inequity of damages under Title 
VII rendered women ―second-class citizens.‖
163
 For instance, Chairman 
                                                          
. . . 
Mr. Baxter. It is an easier problem to deal with because almost never is conduct of an ethnic, racial . . . 
kind appropriate in the work place. But people do have social relationships in the work place that are not 
inappropriate. That‘s the difference. 
 
Id. at 56-58 (conversation between Rep. Miller and Mr. Baxter). 
158. See, e.g., Vol. II, supra note 115, at 89 (testimony of Victor Schachter) (describing the amount 
of punitive damages awarded under California‘s employment discrimination statute and concluding 
―that neither the Commission nor the Judiciary are presently equipped to handle the onslaught of 
additional cases that plaintiffs certainly will pursue in hopes of winning a big jury award‖); id. at 60 
(statement of Rep. Fawell); Vol. III, supra note 115, at 4, 72 (testimony of Edward E. Potter, President, 
National Foundation for the Study of Employment Policies); id. at 441 (prepared statement of Linda 
Ottinger Headley). 
159. See, e.g., Vol. II, supra note 144, at 137 (testimony of Theodore Eisenberg); see also Vol. II, 
supra note 151, at 77 (testimony of William Burns, consultant, Pacific Gas & Electric). 
160. Vol. II, supra note 115, at 70 (statement of Rep. Poshard, Member, H. Comm. on Education 
and Labor); see also id. at 137-140 (testimony of Mr. Eisenberg); id. at 137-140, 145-48 (prepared 
statement of Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab) (analyzing reports regarding the frequency and 
size of compensatory and punitive damages awards in a variety of tort claims). 
161. Vol. II, supra note 141, at 69 (statement of Rep. Payne). 
162. Id.; see also Vol. II, supra note 115, at 188 (statement of Rep. Washington) (acknowledging 
that punitive damages ―can‘t change attitudes in the work place. . . . But [it] can change behavior.‖). 
163. See, e.g., Vol. II, supra note 115, at 77 (statement of William Burns) (testifying that ―[I] think 
it‘s also very, very important to emphasize that the damages that are called for are not new.  Section 
1981 . . . specifically covers intentional racial discrimination. . . . It does not cover discrimination based 
on gender. . . . Since it provides protections not offered by Title VII, we now have a form of disparate 
treatment by the law which seems to imply that some forms of discrimination are somehow more 
tolerable than other.  [Our] position is that women are not second-class citizens and that discrimination 
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Hawkins admitted that he was ―embarrassed that a simple little proposal has 
been so maligned . . . because it is pretty obvious that we are committing some 
serious harm to the women of America the way we are treating them.‖
164
 
Likewise, others declared that ―[t]here is no justification today for the inferior 
treatment of women under a Civil Rights Law,‖
165
 that ―it is wrong in the way 
[Title VII] has been functioning now as it relates to women,‖
166
 and that ―[t]he 
logic and necessity for [providing the same remedy to women and other 
minorities] are unassailable.‖
167
 Additionally, Representative Washington 
explained his belief that providing a full range of damages under Title VII was 
as pivotal to the fight against sex discrimination as it was in the fight against 
race discrimination: 
 
The problem . . . is that our history teaches us in this country that 
far too often the only resource available to most people is the Federal 
court.  You know the history of the civil rights movement in the 
South. . . . If the state courts had been doing their job and enforcing 
the law, we wouldn‘t have had to have overburdened the Federal 
courts with that.  I think that [women] out there [are] a little 
suspicious if all of a sudden we find that the courts don‘t have room 
for the cases involving discrimination against women. If I were one I 
would be affronted by such a notion. That sounds like George Wallace 
standing in the school-house door to me. . . . But to tell people that 
there is a wrong for which there is no remedy, it seems to me is being 
disingenuous. . . . 
We ought not to be proud of a society in which women who are 
discriminated against are put at a disadvantage as compared with 
blacks or Hispanics, or Jewish persons, or anybody else who is 
discriminated against. . . . But the bottom line to Ms. Murphy is that 
the guy walks by and pats her on the butt and she is offended, and I 
am offended because it happens to her, and if she doesn‘t have a 
remedy where she can go to court, where I have one if they call me a 
nigger, then there is a problem with that. 
                                                          
against women is not second-class discrimination.  This is why we support Section 8.‖); id. at 827 
(statement of the National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression). 
164. Id. at 172 (statement by Rep. Hawkins, Chairman, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). 
165. Id. at 619 (prepared statement of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A. Cowan Professor of Law, 
Rutgers Law School). 
166. Id. at 178 (statement of Rep. Hayes, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor). 
167. Id. at 850 (statement of Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Vice President, Plaintiff Employment Lawyers 
Association). 
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Until we arrive at the point where women receive the same kind 
of treatment in our society, in our judicial system, if I were a woman, 
as I said, I would be a little suspect. . . .
168
 
 
Despite the persuasiveness of the testimony at these congressional 
hearings, the Bush Administration, while continuing to support the restoration 
of full damages to claimants of race discrimination under § 1981, remained 
opposed to the provision of the Kennedy-Hawkins bill equalizing damages to 
victims of sex discrimination.
169
 Indeed, the inequity of the Administration‘s 
position was a principal focus of the hearing held before the Senate Committee 
on Labor and Human Resources.
170
 Deputy Attorney General Donald B. Ayer 
defended the Administration‘s position on remedies available to victims of 
gender and race discrimination by characterizing racial discrimination as 
―uniquely abhorrent.‖
171
 As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources, Senator Kennedy questioned him about the President‘s 
opposition to damages: 
 
The CHAIRMAN.  Now my question is why not treat the victims 
of intentional sex . . .  discrimination in the same manner as victims of 
intentional race discrimination?  If you support damages for race 
discrimination, why not support damages for the other equally 
offensive forms of bigotry? 
Mr. AYER.  Well, I think racial discrimination has a history in 
this country that does make it, though not the only serious form of 
discrimination, it makes it unique.  There is a history that we are all 
aware of, going back before even the Civil War, the history of slavery 
and a history of statute, statutory remedies being enacted. 
                                                          
168. Id. at 186-87 (statement of Rep. Washington). 
169. See Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:  Title VII, Section 1981, and the 
Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 801-02 (1991) 
(disagreeing with the Bush Administration‘s position and advocating that ―[t]here is no compelling 
reason to favor [Section] 1981 plaintiffs over other victims of discrimination; indeed, it does a great 
disservice to all victims of discrimination to attempt to classify racial groups as historically more 
deserving of a damages remedy than other victims of intentional discrimination‖). 
170. See Senate Hearing, supra note 115, at 2 (statement of Sen. Kennedy, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Labor and Human Resources ) (explaining that ―victims of sexual harassment on the job currently have 
no effective Federal remedy. The act will close this serious loophole by granting victims of intentional 
discrimination the right to recover compensatory damages. In particularly flagrant cases, punitive 
damages will be available as well.‖). 
171. See Winston, supra note 169, at 802 n.144. Likewise, the Washington Post affirmed the 
opinion that racial discrimination was more deserving of a damages remedy in a June 1990 opinion 
editorial, arguing that ―[r]acial discrimination occupies a place in our history and the law that 
discrimination on such bases as sex . . . simply do[es] not. Its victims have a special status, exercise a 
special claim. . .‖ id. (quoting Op-Ed., The Civil Rights Bill, WASH. POST, Jun. 25, 1990, at A10). 
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The CHAIRMAN.  You can‘t find that same history with regards 
to women? 
Mr. AYER.  I don‘t find the same history, no.  I find a different 
history. 
The CHAIRMAN.  Well, don‘t you find it particularly egregious 
and obnoxious and deplorable? 
Mr. AYER.  I think we have a serious problem of sex 
discrimination in this country. . . . It is our view that the remedies of 
Title VII have, by and large, worked quite well. . . . 
Mr. CHAIRMAN.  Well, the only point, and then I will yield, 
women aren‘t second-class citizens. . . . But I just find it absolutely 
baffling on the whole question we are talking about – intentional 
discrimination – of why, with the opportunity that we have now and 
the record that has been quite amply demonstrated across the 
landscape in our society, why the administration is not prepared to 
deal with that in our society at this time, to be absolutely 
incomprehensible.
172
 
 
This colloquy sparked comments from subsequent witnesses testifying at 
the hearing, as well as from other Senators,
173 
and many witnesses expressed 
outrage that anyone would indicate that sex discrimination was a less egregious 
form of discrimination than any other.
174
 Additionally, Marcia Greenberger, 
managing attorney of the National Women‘s Law Center, testified about the 
challenges faced by African-American women when identifying whether their 
                                                          
172. See Senate Hearing, supra note 115, at 136-37. 
173. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 115, at 104 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum, Member, S. 
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources) (arguing that ―[i]ntentional discrimination against women is 
just as hurtful as intentional racial discrimination. But under current law, the remedies are not the same 
for intentional sex discrimination as they are for intentional race discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 
1990 corrects that inconsistency. The bill applies the damages provisions of Section 1981 which allow 
for compensatory and punitive damages to intentional employment discrimination claims under Title 
VII. Thus, all victims of intentional discrimination in the workplace will be able to receive full and fair 
compensation‖). 
174. Both the Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 
and Marcia Greenberger, managing attorney of the National Women‘s Law Center, directly addressed 
the statements made by Mr. Ayer. Professor Norton testified that ―[o]ne of the anomalies of current 
Federal antidiscrimination law is the availability of damages remedies for some, but not all, victims of 
unlawful discrimination in the workplace.‖  See id.  at 158 (testimony of Professor Norton). 
Ms. Greenberger characterized the lack of remedies as a ―glaring hole in Title VII‖ and argued that 
compensatory and punitive damages ―are just as important for victims of discrimination not protected by 
Section 1981.‖ See id. at 229-30 (testimony of Ms. Greenberger).  She also directly responded to the Mr. 
Ayer‘s comments as follows: 
I want to respond also to a point that was made earlier by the panelists here about deserving victims of 
discrimination. And what I would submit is that these victims of discrimination are, by their very 
definition, deserving of full remedies which include compensation for the direct injuries that they suffer 
as a result of the discrimination and, in those particularly egregious circumstances, punitive damages as 
well. 
Id. at 230 (testimony of Ms. Greenberger). 
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race or their sex was the primary bias motivating their employer.
175
 Ms. 
Greenberger concluded by asserting that ―[d]amages are a reasonable and long-
overdue remedy for victims of intentional [sex] discrimination. . . . 
Furthermore, the addition of damages to Title VII ensures that all victims of 
unlawful discrimination have comparable remedies available to them, sending a 
strong message to the nation that all forms of discrimination are intolerable in 
our society.‖
176
 
By July, both Democratic and Republican senators had either proposed a 
number of other amendments to the legislation or were threatening to do so.
177
 
Senator Kennedy was concerned about the delay and division additional 
amendments would cause
178
 and therefore petitioned to invoke cloture in the 
Senate on July 13, 1990.
179
 The Senate debated the cloture motion on July 17, 
1990, and ultimately invoked cloture by a vote of 62 to 38.
180
 Then, the Senate 
commenced debate on the Kennedy-Hawkins bill, S. 2104, under the cloture 
rules.
181
 
Despite the limited nature of the debate, a substantial portion of the 
discussion in the Senate again focused on the damages provision in Section 8 of 
the bill.  Damages reform was at the center of the floor debate because Senator 
Kassebaum introduced a substitute on July 16 that, among other things, limited 
                                                          
175. Ms. Greenberger explained to the committee: ―[w]e have seen the spectacle in some of the 
courts where black women are concerned of trying to figure out in a Section 1981 case whether the 
discrimination they suffer is because of their race or because of their gender. That is simply an 
unacceptable status of the law right now.‖ Id. at 229-230. 
176. Id. at 233 (prepared statement of Ms. Greenberger). 
177. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,659-60 (1990) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) (contending that ―time is 
now short‖ because ―[o]nly a few weeks remain in this legislative session‖ and arguing that ―[c]loture 
will not be unfair to the opponents of the legislation. . . . Yes, opponents have been waiting to offer 
amendments but so, too, have proponents been waiting. Both sides waited in hopes of reaching a 
compromise with the administration that would not make it necessary to go through the sometimes 
cumbersome process of amendments‖). 
178. For instance, on July 16, Senator Kassebaum introduced a substitute that, among other things, 
capped monetary awards under Section 8 to $100,000. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,624 (1990) (S. 
Amendment No. 2131); 136 CONG. REC. 17,687-88 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
Two days later, Senator Boren lobbied for a different cap that limited punitive damages for all 
employers, regardless of size, to ―$150,000 or the amount awarded in compensatory damages whichever 
is larger.‖ See 136 CONG. REC. 18,010-11 (1990) (statement of Sen. Boren). The Senate ultimately 
rejected the Boren proposal. See 136 CONG. REC. 18,032 (1990) (statement of Sen. Boren). 
179. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,408 (1990). Cloture limits the time in which the Senate may debate 
the bill to a total of thirty hours, with each Senator limited to two speeches totaling one hour. See Govan, 
supra note 98, at 87 (explaining Senator Kennedy‘s strategy in invoking cloture on the Civil Rights Bill 
by stating that he and proponents of the Bill were ―confronted with a stark choice. One option was to 
have the Senate consider the bill without a time agreement amid great uncertainty over the number (and 
nature) of amendments to be offered and whether they had sufficient votes to defeat such amendments. 
The other was to take a vote to invoke cloture which, if successful, automatically imposes a time limit 
on the Senate‘s consideration of the bill‖). 
180. 136 CONG. REC. 17,670 (1990) (Rollcall Vote No. 158). 
181. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,977 (1990) (the President pro tempore of the Senate noted after the 
conclusion of morning business on Thursday, July 18, that only 12 hours remained to consider S. 2104). 
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prevailing plaintiffs to a capped equitable award of $100,000.
182
 Democrats 
argued that the equitable award was unconstitutional because it violated a 
litigant‘s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial,
183
 but also reasserted that 
capping damages under Title VII would treat women as second-class citizens.  
For instance, Senator Bumpers explained: 
 
[I]f I were to vote for the substitute of the Senator from Kansas, 
could I not be fairly accused of saying that if you are discriminated 
against as a racial minority you are entitled to proceed under [Section] 
1981 and receive compensatory and punitive damages, but if you 
proceed under Title VII, which women under the substitute of the 
Senator would be forced to do because they have no rights under 
Section 1981, they would be forced to proceed under Title VII and no 
matter how egregious the matter might be, they would not be entitled 
to anything more than $100,000? . . .  [W]hat I am talking about is are 
women not discriminated against to some extent under the proposal of 
the Senator from Kansas, simply because they are not entitled to the 
same remedy, even under her substitute, that racial minorities are 
entitled to in proceeding under Section 1981?
184
 
 
Ultimately, the Kassebaum substitute was withdrawn and the original 
language of Section 8 providing for unlimited damages remained before the 
Senate for a final vote.
185
 The Senate passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, with 
no limits on compensatory and punitive damages, by a vote of 65-34 on July 
18, 1990.
186
 In addition to 55 Democrats, 10 Republicans voted in favor of the 
bill.
187
 
In the House, Democrats ultimately agreed to a compromise on damages 
before the final vote occurred on the bill. Chairman Hawkins expressly 
disagreed with a universally applicable cap applying to all businesses, but he 
reluctantly agreed to support a cap that applied to small businesses.
188
 Thus, on 
                                                          
182. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,624 (1990) (S. Amendment No. 2131); 136 CONG. REC. 17,687-88 
(1990) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum). 
183. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,981 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
184. 136 CONG. REC. 17,988 (1990) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
185. See 136 CONG. REC. 18,026 (1990) (stating that ―[p]ursuant to the unanimous-consent 
agreement, amendment Nos. 2175 and 2131 are withdrawn‖). 
186. 136 CONG. REC. 18,051 (1990) (indicating passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in the 
Senate); see also 136 CONG. REC. 18,052 (including in the record S. 2104 § 8 (as passed the Senate on 
July 18, 1990)). 
187. The ten Republican Senators who voted in favor of the Senate bill, providing for unlimited 
damages to victims under Title VII, were: Senator Chafee (R – RI); Senator Cohen (R – ME); Senator 
Danforth (R – MO); Senator Domenici (R – NM); Senator Durenberger (R – MN); Senator Hatfield (R – 
OR); Senator Heinz (R – PA); Senator Jeffords (R – VT); Senator Packwood (R – OR); Senator Specter 
(R – PA). 136 CONG. REC. 18,051 (1990) (Vote No. 161). 
188. 136 CONG. REC. 22,023-24 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins). 
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August 2, 1990, Representative Jack Brooks sponsored an amendment that 
added a cap to punitive damages, not compensatory damages, for small 
businesses employing less than 100 employees.
189
 For these businesses, the 
Brooks Amendment specified that an award of punitive damages would not 
exceed the greater of $150,000 or an amount equal to the sum of combined 
compensatory damages and back pay.
190
 
The House approved the Brooks Amendment by a vote of 289-134,
191
 and 
this approach to capping punitive damages was incorporated into the final 
version of the bill approved by the House.
192
  The House passed H.R. 4000 by a 
vote of 272-154 on August 3, 1990.
193
 
The Senate and House bills were then referred to a joint conference of both 
houses which was held on September 25, 1990.
194
 In part, this joint conference 
                                                          
189. Id. at 22,021 (statement and amendment offered by Rep. Brooks). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 22,024. 
192. The final version of Section 8 in the House version of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 stated, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
 
SEC. 8.  PROVIDING FOR DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION. 
     (a)  DAMAGES – Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 … is amended by inserting before 
the last sentence the following new sentences:  ‗With respect to an unlawful employment practice (other 
than an unlawful employment practice established in accordance with section 703(k)) … 
compensatory damages may be awarded; and 
if the respondent (other than a government, government agency, or a political subdivision) engaged in 
the unlawful employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others, punitive damages may be awarded against such respondent; 
In addition to the relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this subsection, except that 
compensatory damages shall not include backpay or any interest thereon.  Compensatory and punitive 
damages and jury trials shall be available only for claims of intentional discrimination.  If compensatory 
or punitive damages are sought with respect to a claim of intentional discrimination arising under this 
title, any party may demand a trial by jury.‘ 
     (b)  LIMITATION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES – Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . 
is amended . . . by adding at the end the following: 
      ‗(2)  If the respondent has fewer than 100 employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, then the amount of punitive damages that may 
be awarded under paragraph (1)(B) to an individual against the  respondent shall not exceed -- 
 $150,000; or 
An amount equal to the sum of compensatory damages awarded under paragraph (1)(A) and equitable 
monetary relief awarded under paragraph (1); whichever is greater.‘ 
 
136 CONG. REC. 22,176 (inserting into the record the final text of H.R. 4000 § 8, as passed by the House 
on Aug. 3, 1990). 
193. 136 CONG. REC. 22,173-74 (1990). 
194. See 136 CONG. REC. 24,749 (1990) (indicating that ―pursuant to House Resolution 449, 
[Representative Hawkins] move[s] to take from the Speaker‘s table the Senate bill (S. 2104) . . . with a 
House amendment thereto, insist[s] on the House amendment and request[s] a conference with the 
Senate thereon‖); id. at 24,848 (recognizing a message from the House that ―the House . . . insists upon 
its amendment to the bill [S. 2104] . . . [and] asks a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes 
of the two Houses thereon‖). 
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was necessary due to the contrary approaches to damages.
195
 The final bill that 
passed the Senate, S. 2104, provided for unlimited damages,
196
 whereas the 
final bill that passed the House contained the Brooks Amendment that capped 
punitive damages for small employers at the greater of $150,000 or an amount 
equal to compensatory damages and backpay.
197
 The joint conference 
committee ultimately adopted the Brooks Amendment‘s caps on punitive 
damages
198
 by a vote of nine to seven, but rather than just apply the caps to 
small employers, the committee recommended the caps apply equally to all 
employers.
199
 
The joint conference committee transmitted its final report recommending 
caps on punitive damages to both the Senate and House for approval and 
consideration.
200
 During consideration of this final conference report, numerous 
Democrats in both houses expressed considerable disagreement with the 
committee‘s decision to incorporate caps into the final bill. For instance, 
Representative Washington stated: 
 
Make no doubt about it, this is still a crumb from the table.  We 
ought to be able to pass one bill one time that puts everybody on par.  
This bill still leaves the women behind, and that troubles me, because 
as a person, deep down inside, I know that we will never have 
equality in this country until we stop looking at each other as being 
different . . . But I plan on being in Congress a long time, and I 
                                                          
195. The Senate initially disagreed with the House‘s approach to damages prior to the joint 
conference. Id. at 24,893 (recording Senate disagreement to the House amendment but agreement to a 
conference). 
196. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text. 
197. 136 CONG. REC. 22,176 (1990). 
198. See 136 CONG. REC. 28,611 (1990) (statement of Rep. Goodling). 
199. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-755, at 16 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that ―[t]he House Amendment, 
but not the Senate Bill, specifies that for respondents employing fewer than 100 employees, punitive 
damages under the Act are limited to $150,000 or an amount equal to the sum of compensatory damages 
and equitable monetary relief, whichever is greater. The Senate recedes with an amendment. The Senate 
amendment makes the limitations on punitive damages applicable to all respondents covered by Title 
VII . . .‖); see also 136 CONG. REC. 28,611-12 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (commenting on the 
differences between the final bill passed by the House and the language in the Joint Committee bill and 
noting that ―[m]embers will recall that punitive damages were capped for employers of fewer than 100. 
The conferees lifted this limitation – approving a punitive damages ceiling applicable to all employers. 
This should allay concerns in the business community and gain broader support for this legislation‖). A 
second joint conference was held on October 11, 1990, but this report did not alter the joint committee‘s 
cap on punitive damages. See H.R. REP. No. 101-856, at 21 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that ―[t]he 
Senate recedes with an amendment. The Senate Amendment makes the limitations on punitive damages 
set forth in the House Amendment applicable to all respondents covered by Title VII . . .‖). 
200. The Senate considered and debated the final conference report on October 16, 1990.  See 136 
CONG. REC. 29,522 (1990) (Sen. Kennedy submitting the conference committee report and asking for its 
immediate consideration).  Likewise, the House considered and debated the final conference report on 
October 17, 1990. See id. at 30,116 (statement of Rep. Wheat). 
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promise that the rest of my career I will continue to remind my 
colleagues every session, ―Do not forget the women. . . .‖
201
 
 
Likewise, Representative Schroeder characterized the caps on punitive 
damages as ―a very hard thing for me to do, to surrender and say, ‗[o]h well, 
women, the nineties aren‘t your decade yet.  Maybe someday we will include 
you fully and treat you as full-fledged citizens.‘‖
202
 Similarly, Representative 
Kennelly pleaded that ―[w]e must always remember, sex discrimination knows 
no boundaries.  It crosses racial distinctions. White women are not immune[].  
Black women are not spared.  Asian women know it well. Put simply, women 
deserve the same protection from sexism, as they do from racism.‖
203
 
Other Democrats expressed disagreement with the caps on punitive 
damages, but explained that it was inserted into the bill during the joint 
conference committee because President Bush threatened to veto the legislation 
without it.
204
 Democrats responded to President Bush‘s demand for a cap by 
arguing that it was a ―[a]n absolute outrage.‖
205
 Indeed, Representative Gray 
contended that the demand was nothing more than sex discrimination: 
 
The fact is that we know what the White House wants. We know 
from the memo that John Sununu sent us last week proposing the 
alternative that the administration wanted. He had the nerve to say that 
this bill would interfere with customer relationships. You remember 
what customer relationships are. Let me remind you. It is what Lester 
Mattox offered as his reason for standing in front of his restaurant 
with an axe handle to deny blacks access to his restaurant. It is what 
universities and country clubs use as their reason why they could not 
admit people whose names were Cohen, Levy, or Goldberg. It is what 
corporations said when they hired women only to do typing and why 
                                                          
201. Id. at 30,119-20 (statement of Rep. Washington). 
202. Id. at 30,123 (statement of Rep. Schroeder). 
203. Id. at 30,135 (statement of Rep. Kennelly). 
204. See Id. at 30,118 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (indicating that ―[t]he major difference between 
the two bills was a cap on punitive damages. The House bill placed a cap on punitive damages of 
$150,000 for nearly all businesses, except large businesses of over 100 employees. The conference 
removed this small business limitation. While I do not support, and did not vote for, any cap or for 
removing the small business limitation, the Senate conferees were insistent on removing the limitation, 
and I support the bill as agreed to by the conference‖); see also id. at 29,530 (statement of Sen. 
Metzenbaum) (stating ―[let] me make this clear. I personally oppose any cap on damages. I believe that 
the jury or the court has the right to determine for itself or themselves what that amount should be. I 
personally resent a cap on damages assessed against a person who has intentionally discriminated 
against women and minorities. It think it is fair to say, Mr. President, the majority of Senate conferees 
oppose any imposition of any cap. At the conference it became clear that a majority of the House 
conferees vehemently opposed any cap, as well‖). 
205. Id. at 30,133 (statement of Rep. Gray) (quoting in part Arthur Fletcher, Chairman of the Civil 
Rights Commission under President Bush). 
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law firms told many women graduates of law schools that they should 
get married and forget a legal career.  
Why? Customer relations. ―Our clients couldn‘t deal with a 
woman lawyer.‖ . . . It is bigotry. It is sexism. It is racism. It is 
discrimination. 
Arthur Fletcher, the Chairman of the Civil Rights Commission, 
appointed by President Bush, said [this] about the White House 
position: 
An absolute outrage. It would take us back to the 1940‘s. I cannot 
believe anyone sincere about civil rights would have proposed such 
language.
206
 
 
Despite the fervent debate over the imposition of caps on punitive 
damages, both houses ultimately approved the final conference report 
containing the caps,
207
 and it was included in the final bill that was presented to 
the President.
208
 President Bush vetoed the bill in October.
209
 The bill was 
returned to the Senate, and the Senate failed to override the Presidential veto by 
just one vote: a vote that crossed party lines and now included the support of 
eleven Republicans.
210
 
After the Senate failed to override the veto, the President submitted his 
alternative version of the bill in both houses.
211
 Section 8 of the President‘s bill 
was entitled ―Providing for Additional Equitable Relief in Certain Cases of 
Intentional Discrimination‖ and did not allow the recovery of compensatory or 
punitive damages.
212
 The President‘s bill received very little attention and died 
after being referred to various committees in both houses.
213
 
                                                          
206. Id. 
207. See id. at 30,136 (House voted 273 to 154 to accept the conference report) (Roll No. 478); id. 
at 29,606 (Senate voted 62 to 34 to approve the conference report) (Rollcall Vote No. 276). 
208. See id. at 28,789-97 (final conference committee version). 
209. See PRESIDENT‘S MESSAGE TO THE SENATE RETURNING WITHOUT APPROVAL S. 2104, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, S. DOC. NO. 101-35 at 1 (2d. Sess. 1990) (indicating that he transmitted his 
own version of a civil rights bill on October 20, 1990); see also 136 CONG. REC. 33,378 (1990). 
210. The final vote in the Senate was 66-34 to override the Presidential veto. The eleven 
Republican Senators that voted to override the President‘s veto were: Senator Boschwitz (R – MN); 
Senator Chafee (R – RI); Senator Cohen (R – ME); Senator Danforth (R – MO); Senator Domenici (R – 
NM); Senator Durenberger (R – MN); Senator Hatfield (R – OR); Senator Heinz (R – PA); Senator 
Jeffords (R – VT); Senator Packwood (R – OR); Senator Specter (R – PA). 136 Cong. Rec. 33,406 
(1990) (Vote No. 304). The vote was identical to the original vote on July 18, 1990, in the Senate 
approving S. 2104 with the exception of newly elected Republican Senator Boschwitz, also voting to 
override the veto. Compare supra note 187 (Vote No.161), with supra note 210 (Vote No. 304). 
Tensions ran high during the voting, as the Reverend Jessie Jackson, a civil rights leader, and David 
Duke, a white supremacist candidate for governor of Louisiana, observed the debate and voting from 
opposite sides of the Senate gallery. See Goodman, supra note 105, at 217. 
211. See 136 CONG. REC. 33,531 (1990) (introducing the President‘s version of the bill, S. 3239, in 
the Senate); id. at 33,751-52 (introducing the President‘s version of the bill, H.R. 5905, in the House). 
212. Instead, the President‘s bill afforded the trial judge with discretionary authority to issue an 
equitable award not exceeding $150,000 when the trial court determined an additional amount was 
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Although Democrats and civil rights leaders failed to garner enough 
support to pass a civil rights bill in 1990, Senator Kennedy vowed to renew 
legislative efforts to enact one the next year.
214
 While Democrats did, in fact, 
succeed in passing a civil rights act in 1991, they did so by compromising the 
rights of women to recover full compensatory and punitive damages under Title 
VII. Congressional leaders advanced convincing arguments, similar to those 
raised during the debate of the 1990 bill, to justify unlimited compensatory and 
punitive damages for victims of sex discrimination. Despite these arguments, 
however, Republican leaders demanded a greater compromise in 1991 in order 
to secure passage of the bill. Rather than advocating solely for limiting the 
availability of punitive damages as they did during the 1990 debate, the 1991 
compromise also required the forfeiture of complete compensatory damages as 
well. 
 
B. Surrendering to Compromise: Enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
 
On January 3, 1991, Representative Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (―H.R. 1‖) as the 
first bill of the House of Representatives in the 102nd Congress.
215
 When 
introducing H.R. 1 on the floor of the House, Representative Brooks declared 
that one of the primary purposes of the bill was to achieve parity between 
discrimination claims brought by women under Title VII and those brought by 
racial minorities under § 1981.
216
 The original version of H.R. 1 did not contain 
any caps on punitive or compensatory damages despite the fact that Democrats 
previously had agreed to cap punitive damages in the final version of the civil 
rights bill vetoed by President Bush in 1990.
217
 Thus, opponents of the 
legislation regarded this second attempt as ―nearly identical to, and with respect 
to damages, [] worse than the bill which was vetoed by the President . . .‖
218
 
                                                          
―needed to deter the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practices.‖ 136 CONG. 
REC. at 33,532 (S. 3239, § 8). 
213. See Govan, supra note 98, at 154 n.656. 
214. See Goodman, supra note 105, at 217 n.234 (citing Helen Dewar, Senate Upholds Civil Rights 
Bill Veto, Dooming Measure for 1990, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1990, at A15). 
215. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991); 137 CONG. REC. 88 (1991). 
216. See 137 CONG. REC. 229 (1991) (statement of Rep. Brooks). 
217. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong. § 8 (1st Sess. 1991). 
218. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 52 n.2 (1991) (Conf. Rep.) (dissenting views); see also Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991) (hearings were held on February 7 and 28 and March 7, 1991) 
[hereinafter ―Judiciary Comm. Hearings‖] at 24 (statement of Rep. Hyde, Member, Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights). 
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Moreover, Democrats strategically titled the House bill the ―Civil Rights 
and Women‘s Equity in Employment Act of 1991‖ to further emphasize that 
one of its primary purposes was to equalize the value of discrimination claims 
brought by women and racial minorities.
219
 Even Republican leaders in the 
House acknowledged the significance of the new name allotted to H.R. 1, 
stating in the minority report: 
This year, proponents of H.R. 1 have ‗changed the nameplate‘ of 
H.R. 1. No longer is this a bill to combat racial discrimination, we are 
told, it is now a ―woman‘s equity‖ bill. The thrust of the argument is 
that a black woman who is subject to intentional discrimination can 
receive punitive and compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. 1981 
while a white woman can only sue under title VII and is limited to 
injunctive relief, attorneys [fees] and an award of backpay. Thus, 
according to the proponents, Title VII must be amended to achieve 
―parity‖ — a white woman is entitled to the same damages as a black 
woman.
220
 
 
Others openly declared that women were the ―primary beneficiaries of 
H.R. 1,‖
221
 and acknowledged that the damages provision was the primary 
stumbling block to the enactment of the legislation in 1990.
222
 Thus, while the 
1990 battle for amending Title VII ultimately had not been successful, both 
sides began the 1991 effort sharply focused on the inequities of damages for 
women under Title VII.   
Two committees in the House held hearings in 1991 on H.R. 1, and some 
of these hearings emulated the strategy advanced during the 1990 debate by 
focusing exclusively on the need for providing damages to victims of sex 
                                                          
219. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 14 (1991) (Conf. Rep.). 
220. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 70 (1991) (Conf. Rep.). 
221. Hearings on H.R.1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 102d Cong. (1991) (hearings were held on February 27 and March 5, 1991) 
[hereinafter ―Educ. Comm. Hearings‖] at 378 (prepared statement of Rep. Jefferson, Member, H. 
Comm. on Education and Labor) (explaining that ―[t]he fundamental purpose of H.R. 1 is to rectify a 
colossal inequity in current Federal civil rights law, and make good on the Constitution‘s promise of fair 
treatment to all its citizens–women and men. . . . The truth is, the primary beneficiaries of the fruits of 
this bill will be women, not racial minorities. H.R. 1 would bring women under the same protective 
umbrella that shelters other American citizens from discrimination in the workplace. The present law 
does not provide women the same remedies, punitive and compensatory damages, that are already 
available to racial minorities under Section 1981‖). 
222. See id. at 72 (statement of Rep. Gunderson, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor) 
(explaining to Dr. Hartmann that this bill ―follow[s] up at a later time on trying to resolve the whole 
issue of damages . . . and whether or not we have to change the civil rights law from make whole to jury 
trials and punitive damages because I think this is the area that‘s holding us up, frankly.‖ Dr. Hartmann 
thereafter responded by acknowledging that ―[y]es, I can see it‘s the area that‘s holding you up. I guess 
I‘d refer there to the comments that Representative Mink made that we do have now an unfortunate 
inequality in the remedies that are available to people who are discriminated against based on two 
different laws‖). 
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discrimination.
223
 First, the House Committee on Education and Labor held 
hearings on February 27 and March 5, 1991.
224
 The February hearing was 
dedicated completely to challenges facing women in the workplace, including a 
discussion of the inequitable remedies available under Title VII for victims of 
intentional sex discrimination.
225
 The witnesses who testified at the February 
hearing were impressive and included several victims of sexual harassment,
226
 
one of whom was one of the first female attorneys to sue their law firm for sex 
discrimination.
227
 
Additionally, several expert witnesses explored issues related to sex 
discrimination that only were briefly explored during the 1990 hearings.
228
 For 
instance, Dr. Heidi Hartmann, a labor economist who was serving as the 
Director of the Institute for Women‘s Policy Research, testified about the 
results of her research on the economic disadvantages of sexual 
discrimination.
229
 Dr. Hartmann offered testimony on both the discriminatory 
wage gap between men and women workers and the sex segregation of women 
into lower paying jobs in the labor market.
230
 Similarly, Dr. Freada Klein 
                                                          
223. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 17 (1991) (Conf. Rep.). 
224. See Educ. Comm. Hearings, supra note 221; Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 218; see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, supra note 223. 
225. See Educ. Comm. Hearings, supra note 221, at 23-24 (statement of Rep. Ford, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Education and Labor) (indicating that the ―principle focus will be on the lack of monetary 
relief for intentional sex discrimination under current law‖ but that ―[w]e will also discuss barriers to the 
high level advancement of women and minorities in business, as well as the issue of pay equity for 
women and minorities‖). Although damages were mentioned again briefly at the second hearing on 
March 5, 1991, it focused primarily on the need to restore civil rights protections that were altered by the 
six Supreme Court decisions issued between 1988 and 1989. Id. at 377 (statement of Rep. Ford) 
(indicating that ―[l]ast week, the committee‘s principal focus was on issues relating to the remedies 
available for correcting workplace wrongs. . . . This week we will look at issues relating to the burden of 
proving unfair employment practices. . . . H.R. 1 overturns a number of Supreme Court decisions which 
protect employers who discriminate‖). 
226. See Educ. Comm. Hearings, supra note 221, at 76 (prepared statement of Lois Robinson) 
(describing her experiences as a victim of sex harassment); id. at 121 (testimony of Jackie Morris) 
(testifying as a victim of sexual harassment); see also id. at 132 (testimony of Nancy O‘Mara Ezold) 
(testifying as a victim of intentional sexual discrimination). 
227. See id. at 132 (testimony of Nancy O‘Mara Ezold) (describing her Title VII lawsuit as ―a 
precedent-setting case‖ because ―I am the first attorney even to sue other attorneys for this kind of 
wrong‖). 
228. See id. at 33 (testimony of Dr. Heidi Hartmann); id. at 188 (testimony of Dr. Freada Klein). 
229. See id. at 41-64 (prepared statement of Dr. Hartmann including the results of some of her 
social science research). 
230. Id. at 34-37 (testimony of Dr. Hartmann) (describing both the sex gap in wages and the sex 
segregation of women into lower paying jobs in the workforce). For instance, Representative Miller 
questioned Dr. Hartmann about the economic disadvantages of sexual harassment and discrimination in 
the workplace: 
 
MR. MILLER.  What do we know about women who leave their jobs as a result of discriminatory 
practices or serious harassment?  Women who simply walk away with an unreported action, who can‘t 
take it any longer, or won‘t take it and leave? 
. . . 
FINAL ZEHRT MACROED (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2014  12:50 PM 
284 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 25:284 
 
testified regarding the results of a sexual harassment survey that she conducted 
and she explained that, ―90 percent of sexual harassment goes unreported to the 
employer.‖
231
 Based on her research, it was Dr. Klein‘s opinion that Title VII‘s 
remedial scheme was inadequate because it ―[fell] far short of, first, making 
victims whole for their losses; second, encouraging victims to come forward to 
enforce the statute; and third, and especially, deterring future discriminatory 
behavior by employers.‖
232
 
Others testifying at the February hearing directly opposed the idea 
previously raised by the Administration and other Republican leaders that sex 
discrimination is not as reprehensible as other forms of intentional 
discrimination such as race discrimination. For instance, Professor Susan Deller 
Ross, of Georgetown University Law Center, testified that Title VII ―must 
provide for complete damages for intentional discrimination‖ in part because 
there is a ―need to send an unequivocal message to the employers of this 
country that Congress considers discrimination against women workers to be 
just as reprehensible and just as illegal as other forms of discrimination.‖
233
 She 
further explained the historical reasons this unequivocal message was 
necessary: 
 
Women workers have long struggled against the idea that sex 
discrimination is somehow not as reprehensible or as illegal as other forms 
of discrimination. When Title VII was first enacted, there were jokes in 
the popular press about whether men could be Playboy bunnies. And the 
clear implication was that the law‘s sex discrimination coverage was not 
to be taken seriously. Employers got the message. 
                                                          
MS. HARTMANN. . . . There hasn‘t been much in terms of quantifying the cost of people, women who 
leave jobs because of sexual harassment.  But there have been some surveys. The general feeling is that 
less than 10 percent of sexual harassment is ever reported. 
So there is a great deal of this happening that doesn‘t even come to anyone‘s attention.  The woman does 
exactly what you say, leaves quietly, and that employer faces a turnover cost. . . . So they are quite 
significant. 
MR. MILLER.  Again, under Section 1981, you would have to []prove intentional discrimination.  What 
concerns me is that when I listen to some members of the business community and other people oppose 
this bill, the suggestion is that somehow the penalty is unfair; that people may end up suing you for a lot 
of money if we determine that people‘s rights have been intentionally violated. 
I assume . . . that much of the decision about intentional discrimination as it relates to women is an 
economic decision that you will be able to pay this person less because they are a woman or because 
they are a minority and your company or your economic endeavor will, in fact, profit from that activity.  
This is an intentional decision that was made to take people of equal talent or equal skills or equal 
education attainment and treat them differently. . . . 
Ms. Hartmann.  Right. Exactly. I think, for example, that‘s one of the reasons why we see the wage gap 
increase between women and men in the law field, for example. . . . 
 
Id. at 68-69. 
231. Id. at 168-171 (testimony of Dr. Klein). 
232. Id. at 170. 
233. Id. at 330 (testimony of Professor Ross). 
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Instead of eliminating the host of explicit rules differentiating between 
men and women workers, they chose to defend them in court. . . . Thus, 
for years, women were forced to litigate what seemed like the most clear-
cut cases, frequently all the way to the Supreme Court. . . . 
If Congress considers and then rejects the addition of full damages to 
Title VII for intentional discrimination, it will be sending the wrong 
message to employers. Capping damages would also be sending the wrong 
message, for the reality would remain that damages would be capped only 
for women. Under [Section] 1981, blacks and other minority groups would 
continue to have the availability of punitive and compensatory damages. 
Consequently, the message in either case would be that Congress 
believes discrimination against women workers to be less serious than 
other forms of discrimination. The history of employer resistance to equal 
treatment for women workers shows that they would be delighted to 
receive that message and to act on it.
234
 
 
Several Representatives also addressed the idea that sex discrimination was 
less reprehensible than race discrimination and, thus, justified limited 
damages.
235
 For example, Representative Washington declared that ―[i]t‘s not 
fair for a black woman to have one remedy and for a white woman to have a 
different remedy. It seems to me, anybody who doesn‘t agree with that doesn‘t 
agree with civil rights at all.‖
236
 After some Republican Congressmen 
continued to express support for capped damages to victims of sex 
discrimination, even Chairman Ford became heatedly involved in the debate 
and argued with one witness in favor of equal remedies for victims of sex and 
race discrimination: 
 
Chairman Ford: Well, now, as a lawyer you give me a catch-22 
sort of situation to deal with. I would like to support this legislation, 
but if in fact I follow the rationale of your reasoning, affording these 
                                                          
234. Id. at 331-332. 
235. Id. at 26 (statement of Rep. Mink, Member, H. Comm. on Education and Labor) (explaining 
that the two-tiered system of remedies is ―exactly the situation under our current laws. It creates two 
separate and discrete classes of victims of intentional discrimination.  It‘s important to be crystal clear 
on this point. . . . Members of racial groups covered by Section 1981 . . . [are] entitled to full 
compensatory and punitive damages. However, women . . . are not entitled to Section 1981 protections 
regardless of the mental, emotional and physical pain that people have suffered and endured because of 
discrimination. They are limited to wage related remedies. Today we will hear powerful testimony from 
real victims of this discrimination that is practiced in all areas of employment. Women who have gone to 
court, won their cases, suffered unspeakable humiliation and degradation and yet because of the 
limitation of remedies under Title VII have been unable to recover compensation for their losses. After 
nearly 20 years of experience under Title VII, it is fully appropriate, indeed long overdue, Mr. 
Chairman, that we reevaluate and reinstate common sense, common law concepts of equity in applying 
all of the laws with regard to discrimination in the workplace‖). 
236. Id. at 29 (statement of Rep. Washington). 
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potential damage awards as a remedy to women would act against 
their best interest – what we really should be considering is repealing 
that remedy for race discrimination cases; should we not? Has it had 
that effect on race discrimination? . . . 
Now, if that‘s the case, does anyone at that table advocate that we 
repeal the damages remedy for race discrimination case in order to 
enhance their protection? 
Ms. Hemminger.  No, I don‘t believe anyone at this – 
Chairman Ford.  Why not? 
Ms. Hemminger.  [Section] 1981 does not – 
. . . 
Chairman Ford.  Because you‘re afraid to take on race, but you‘re 
not afraid to take on women? Why not? If you really believe that we 
would be hurting women by giving them the same remedy as we give 
people who assert race as a cause of their damage then why aren‘t you 
concerned about what we are doing adversely to the people who are 
victims of race discrimination? 
Ms. Hemminger.  Section 1981 does not have the comprehensive 
remedial scheme that‘s found in Title VII with the intent to eliminate 
and resolve discrimination claims as quickly as possible. 
. . . 
Chairman Ford.  . . . Then, what you‘re telling me now, is, the 
objection is not to the availability of compensatory damages, but 
where it appears in the law. 
Suppose we make it a free-standing provision like [Section] 1981, 
and don‘t attach it to Title VII, does the awarding of damages, then 
made legal by that provision of law, meet your test? 
Ms. Hemminger. I think that would be most unfortunate, because 
I certainly believe – 
Chairman Ford.  Then, really what you are objecting to is the 
awarding of damages, not where it is in the statute? 
Ms. Hemminger. I think I am addressing both. . . . 
Chairman Ford. . . . Because I can remember . . . having a jury 
with tears in its eyes, come to me when they awarded me $6,000 for 
the death of a woman, because she was only a woman. And I asked 
him, what about the instructions you had from the judge about what 
her value–even though she was only a waitress, and daddy was a 
carpenter–that she had to her family if she had been allowed to live 
beyond her twenties. 
And this fine, religious fundamentalist, who ended up as the 
foreman of the jury, with a tear in his eyes, handed me a religious tract 
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and said, ―After all, women have no value.‖  Now, that was Detroit, 
Michigan . . . 
Things have been changing, changing very rapidly. And what I 
think I have heard here is an explanation of justification for the way 
things were. Not for the way things are. And I have to tell you that 
I‘m not persuaded by what you say, that real concern for deleterious 
impact on women, who are victims of sex discrimination, is at the 
base of your testimony against money damages.
237
 
 
Additionally, the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights also held three hearings on H.R. 1
238
 and Democrats commenced 
the first hearing by continuing to emphasize the inequities of remedies 
between sex and race discrimination.
239
 Republicans responded, however, 
with a novel argument.  Although Republicans resisted the comparison of 
§ 1981 with Title VII remedies during the 1990 debate, now they asserted 
that the ―easy‖ solution to providing damages for victims of sexual 
harassment was to amend § 1981 to include protection for sexual 
harassment.
240
 At the hearing held on February 7, 1991, Representative 
Washington challenged John R. Dunne, the Assistant Attorney General for 
Civil Rights, about the Administration‘s inconsistent position on 
amending § 1981: 
 
Mr. Washington: I am troubled, Mr. Dunne, by two things. One, 
the administration took the position that because of the long history of 
Title 42 of the U.S. Code, Section 1981 and its origins out of slavery, 
that it ought not be tampered with with respect to an attempt to 
equalize the rights of women on the one hand, and then the suggestion 
you made a moment ago that the Congress could have amended that 
statute. But that is neither here nor there. I am troubled by the 
practical effect of a lawyer in private practice being presented with 
two women who came into his or her office having been employed by 
the same company. One who came in with an egregious case of sexual 
harassment, the other who came in with an egregious case of sexual 
and racial harassment–tried together before a jury. . . . But the point I 
want to make is that as I understand the present state of the law, one 
would happen to be black, the other would happen to be white. The 
                                                          
237. Id. at 367-69 (statement of Rep. Ford). 
238. See Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 218. 
239. See id. at 23 (statement of Rep. Edwards, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (contending 
that H.R. 1 was necessary to ―fill a serious gap in the law to provid[e] the same damages remedy for 
women . . . that are already available to racial minorities‖). 
240. Id. at 55-56 (dialogue between Rep. Edwards and Mr. John R. Dunne). 
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one who was black would have no limit on the amount of damages 
that she could receive. The one who was white, given the proposal 
that has been put forward and the objection made by the 
administration, would have an absolute limit on how much the jury 
could award her, even if they felt that the sexual harassment that had 
been visited upon her was much more egregious. 
How can we call ourselves being fair and even with people when 
within the class of people who are discriminated against we 
discriminate?
241
 
 
Subsequent to this hearing, Representative Towns, a Democrat from New 
York, offered an amendment to H.R. 1 that seized on the suggestion offered by 
Mr. Dunne.
242
 Specifically, the Towns Substitute Amendment proposed to 
amend § 1981 to ensure equal contract rights for women, thereby effectively 
affording women with a cause of action for sex discrimination under § 1981 
and simultaneously extending to women § 1981‘s unlimited damages.
243
 The 
Towns Amendment was defeated in the House by a vote of 152 to 277.
244
 
In March, Republicans introduced President Bush‘s version of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.
245
 Not only did this proposal differ substantially from H.R. 
1, but it also was substantially weaker than the President‘s 1990 proposal. With 
regard to remedies, the Administration‘s proposal likewise was more limited 
than his proposal the previous year. Although the President‘s 1990 proposal 
authorized courts with power to make equitable awards not exceeding $150,000 
to any victim of intentional discrimination,
246
 his 1991 proposal only provided 
an equitable monetary award for victims of sexual harassment. Under this new 
damages provision, ―the court may‖ award victims of sexual harassment an 
amount ―not exceeding a total of $150,000‖ if the court determines, after 
applying a number of factors, that such an award was ―justified under the 
equities.‖
247
 
The President‘s proposed bill provoked a considerable amount of criticism 
from Democrats in the House at the hearing held by the Subcommittee on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights on March 7, 1991.
248
 In fact, Representative 
                                                          
241. Id. at 58 (statement of Rep. Washington). 
242. 137 CONG. REC. 13,237-41 (1991) (H. Amdt. 91 & statement of Rep. Towns). 
243. Id. at § 17. 
244. Id. at 13,253 (Roll No. 127). 
245. Id. at 5,656 (statement of Sen. Dole) (introducing the President‘s version of the bill in the 
Senate); id. at 5,863 (statement of Rep. Michel) (introducing the President‘s version of the bill in the 
House). 
246. S. 3239, 101st Cong. § 8(3) (1990). 
247. S. 611, 102d Cong. § 8(m)(1) (1991). 
248. See, e.g., Judiciary Comm. Hearings supra note 218, at 217, 327 (statement of Rep. Edwards); 
id. at 328 (statement of Rep. Washington). 
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Edwards‘ opening remarks at the hearing were addressed to the President and 
expressed his outrage at the inadequacies of the President‘s proposal: 
 
The President‘s bill that we received earlier this week would also 
allow courts to award up to $150,000 in equitable monetary relief for 
harassment cases if certain conditions are met. Now let‘s be very clear 
about that. Harassment is already illegal under Title VII. There is no 
need for an explicit recognition of this fact. 
The debate now is over what should be the remedy for intentional, 
egregious discrimination. A victim of harassment does not have to 
meet additional conditions in order to make a case of harassment 
under existing law. Yet the President‘s bill imposes new restrictions 
on the right of a harassment victim to get relief, including a shorter 
time period and complaining through the employers‘ grievance 
system. We ask why does the President want to put additional burdens 
on victims of harassment. . . 
249
 
 
Several Republican witnesses also referenced the President‘s bill and 
finally acknowledged that victims of sexual harassment ―may need a further 
remedy.‖
250
 
In April, the House Committee on Education and Labor reported favorably 
on H.R. 1 and recommended that the House pass the bill with unlimited 
damages.
251
 The report documented the need for providing damages for victims 
of sex discrimination by explaining that ―[a]n unfair prejudice exists in federal 
civil rights law‖ because § 1981 ―permit[s] the recovery of unlimited 
compensatory and punitive damages to victims of intentional race 
discrimination‖ but ―[no] similar remedy exists in cases of intentional gender . . 
. discrimination.‖
252
 The report thereafter asserted that ―[w]here the 
manifestations of prohibited conduct are the same, and the harms caused are the 
                                                          
249. Id. at 217-18 (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
250. Id. at 38 (prepared statement of John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights 
Division, U.S. Dept of Justice) (contending that ―the Administration has repeatedly called for effective 
remedies against sexual harassment on the job. . . . I urge you to pass quickly those civil rights initiatives 
on which we agree‖); id. at 193 (statement of Zachary D. Fasman, on behalf of the National Association 
of Manufacturers and the Society for Human Resource Management) (admitting that there is ―one area 
which Title VII prohibits where there is no economic injury, and that is in the area of harassment. . . . 
That is a problem with harassment. That‘s what I was talking about before. It seems to me that certainly 
in Congress, both in the last session and this session, that harassment, particularly sexual harassment 
law, may need a further remedy. There may have to be an economic incentive built in it to compensate 
these people‖); id. at 196 (statement of Zachary D. Fasman) (addressing questions from Chairman 
Edwards and acknowledging ―that it seems to me that the normal type of remedy, as I‘ve said before, 
may not cover cases involving sexual harassment. There may be a need for an additional remedy there. 
I‘ve already conceded that‖). 
251. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 17, 18 (1991) (Conf. Rep.). 
252. Id. at 65. 
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same, the remedies should be the same as well.‖
253
 The report also directly 
criticized the Administration‘s position on providing only limited damages for 
victims of sex discrimination, stating that ―[b]ecause the Administration is in 
favor of restoring the damages remedy in case of intentional racial 
discrimination, it should have no objection to providing the same rights to 
women. . . ―
254
 Given the favorable committee reports, Representative Brooks 
and Representative Ford placed H.R. 1 on the House calendar on June 4, 1991 
for a full vote.
255
 
Before the scheduled vote in the House, two additional substitute 
amendments were offered to H.R. 1: the first by Republican Congressman 
Robert Michel and the second by Democratic Congressman Brooks.
256
 
Representative Michel‘s substitute amendment was submitted on behalf of the 
Administration and did not provide any compensatory or punitive damages,
257
 
but only an equitable award in cases of harassment.
258
 This amendment failed 
by a vote of 162 to 266 on June 4, 1991.
259
 
On the other hand, the Brooks-Fish Substitute passed by a vote of 264 to 
166 on June 5, 1991.
260
 The Brooks-Fish Substitute only capped punitive 
damages and did not cap compensatory damages at all.
261
 Specifically, punitive 
damages were capped in the amount of $150,000, or an amount equal to 
compensatory damages, whichever was greater.
262
 Displeased with the 
proposed cap on punitive damages, Republicans argued that it was an 
insufficient limitation because it was variable based on the size of the 
compensatory damages award. For example, Representative Hyde described it 
as ―a phony cap‖
263
 and Representative Goodling declared that it was ―not a 
cap at all‖ because the ―‗cap‘ constantly floats.‖
264
 In addition, Representative 
Stenholm argued that the term cap was ―misleading‖ because it ―will act as [a] 
floor[]‖ when the compensatory damage award exceeds $150,000, and then is 
―removed‖ completely.
265
 
                                                          
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 15. 
255. 137 CONG. REC. 13,195 (1991) (statement of Speaker McNulty) (indicating that ―[p]ursuant to 
House Resolution 162 . . . the Chair declares the . . . Whole House on the State of the Union for 
consideration of the bill, H.R. 1‖); id. (statement of Rep. Brooks) (declaring that he is ―proud to bring to 
the floor the bill H.R. 1‖). 
256. 137 CONG. REC. 13,253-58 (1991) (H. Amdt. 92 & statement of Rep. Michel); id. at 13,515 
(H. Amdt. 93 & statement of Rep. Brooks). 
257. Id. at 13,254 at § 8. 
258. Id at § 8. 
259. Id. at 13,265 (Roll No. 128). 
260. Id. at 13,552-53 (Roll No. 130). 
261. Id. at 13,515 (H. Amdt. 93 & statement of Rep. Brooks). 
262. Id. at 13,516 (statement of Rep. Brooks). 
263. Id. at 13,522 (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
264. Id. at 13,525 (statement of Rep. Goodling). 
265. Id. at 13,537 (statement of Rep. Stenholm). 
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Although Democrats agreed to support the Brooks-Fish Substitute if 
necessary to achieve the enactment of a Civil Rights Bill, many were 
disgruntled with the idea of capping punitive damage awards.
266
 Many 
representatives also expressed frustration with President Bush, who once again 
was threatening to veto the civil rights bill passed by the House despite the 
Democratic compromise on capping damages.
267
 Some of these representatives, 
such as Representative Berman, accused President Bush of being insensitive to 
women‘s issues and indicated that this was the reason the President again was 
threatening to veto H.R. 1.
268
 
                                                          
266. 137 CONG. REC. 13,531 (1991) (statement of Rep. Morella) (acknowledging that ―the 
substitute is the best we can achieve here today‖ but stating that ―I feel strongly that every victim of 
intentional discrimination should be treated fairly and equitably. . . . Mr. Chairman, the battle for equal 
rights is not yet won, especially for women‖); id. at 13,540 (statement of Rep. Zimmer) (conceding that 
―I will vote for the Brooks-Fish substitute because it is a significant improvement over the current law‖); 
id. at 13,541 (statement of Rep. Brooks) (clarifying that ―I don‘t want anyone to think that the Brooks-
Fish substitute is a perfect bill‖); id. at 13,542 (1991) (statement of Rep. Collins) (declaring that ―there 
are provisions of the Brooks-Fish substitute that I find unacceptable. . . . [They] have been placed in the 
substitute in an effort to work with President Bush, and while I strenuously disagree with them, I shall 
vote for Brooks-Fish‖); id. at 13,547-48 (statement of Rep. McMillen) (declaring that ―[d]iscrimination 
for whatever reason should be treated equally under the law; subject to the same judicial remedies and 
awards. Creating a two-tiered approach to discrimination by placing a cap on punitive damages for 
women and the handicapped is undesirable. . . . Reluctantly, after weighing the pros and cons . . . I have 
concluded . . . [t]his, it appears, is the only way to pass a civil rights bill in today‘s Congress‖); id. at 
13,548 (statement of Rep. Markey) (acknowledging that he preferred ―the Towns-Schroeder substitute‖ 
because it ―would not have included a ceiling on damages for women. . . . Despite my opposition to such 
a ceiling, I, nonetheless, must now support the Brooks-Fish substitute as the strongest version remaining 
that can correct the weakening effects of recent court decisions‖); id. (statement of Rep. Weiss) 
(declaring that he ―support[s] the Brooks-Fish substitute‖ but he believes ―the committee‘s original bill 
(H.R. 1), would better protect victims of discrimination‖); id. at 13,550 (statement of Rep. Skaggs) 
(acknowledging that ―[t]he issue of caps on damages available to victims of discrimination persists‖ and 
admitting that the inclusion of a cap in Brooks-Fish is one more instance of the effort made by 
supporters of this bill to enact a law‖). 
267. See 137 CONG. REC. 13,549 (1991) (statement of Rep. Weiss) (declaring that ―the Bush 
Administration continues to . . . sacrifice civil rights legislation and the victims of discrimination for the 
sake of partisan advantages. The Administration‘s attempts to derail real civil rights legislation are 
inflaming racial tension and polarizing our society along lines of gender and skin color.‖); id. at 13,546 
(statement of Rep. Cox) (arguing that the ―substitute addresses everything the President has stated as 
being wrong with the original bill, H.R. 1. However, the President continues to promise to veto this bill 
as amended in the Brooks-Fish substitute‖); id. at 13,550 (statement of Rep. Skaggs) (asking ―[w]hat 
more does the President want?  Or is it that he really does not want a civil rights bill, that he‘s more 
interested in an issue to divide Americans and benefit his party‘s political agenda?‖); id. at 13,546 
(statement of Rep. Hoyer) (expressing that he is ―greatly disturbed that we are back again to do what we 
know is fair and just and we once again are being threatened with a Presidential veto. This same 
President who claims he wants to sign a civil rights bill has quashed all efforts to come to a reasonable 
compromise on the bill and has sabotaged the efforts of the business and civil rights communities to 
work together to resolve their differences‖). 
268. Id. at 13,541 (statement of Rep. Berman) (stating that he ―want[s] to also say a word about the 
particular burdens women face in the workplace. The administration, by barring women from recovering 
compensatory or punitive damages in title VII cases, is in essence saying that they must continue to 
suffer intentional discrimination in silence, because we will not take it seriously. Misconduct that 
offends us we make punishable by monetary damages under our system of civil justice. . . . I, for one, 
believe that it is long past time that we take discrimination against women seriously, and act to prohibit 
and redress it‖). 
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Despite the objections of legislators from both parties, on June 5, 1991, the 
House approved both the Brooks-Fish Substitute,
269
 and immediately thereafter, 
the House approved H.R. 1 as amended, by a vote of 273 to 158.
270
 The House 
thereafter referred H.R. 1 to the Senate.
271
 
However, the Senate never voted on the House bill.
272
 Instead, Republican 
Senator John Danforth from Missouri proposed bill S. 1209 on June 4, 1991, 
the day before the House passed H.R. 1.
273
 Prior to Senator Danforth‘s bill, 
Senator Kennedy had negotiated with the Administration, business groups, and 
Senate Republicans throughout February and March to draft a compromise bill, 
but did not officially propose that bill for lack of support.
274
 Thus, Senator 
Danforth‘s bill was the initial focus of the civil rights debate in the Senate. 
Senate Bill 1209 received considerable attention not only because it was 
the first serious civil rights proposal in the Senate in 1991, but also because the 
damages provisions contained in S. 1209 were radically different than previous 
proposals in either house in 1990 or 1991. Specifically, S. 1209 allowed the 
recovery of compensatory damages for victims of intentional discrimination, 
but it capped the recovery of those damages based on the size of the 
employer.
275
 For employers with more than 100 employees, the bill established 
the cap for compensatory damages at $150,000 excluding back pay and 
interest.
276
 For employers with 15 to 100 employees, the bill established the cap 
for compensatory damages at $50,000.
277
 Moreover, S. 1209 did not permit the 
recovery of punitive damages, but instead provided for an additional equitable 
award under certain circumstances.
278
 This amount of the equitable award 
likewise was capped based on the size of the employer: employers with more 
than 100 employees were subject to an additional award of up to $150,000; and 
employers with 100 employees or less were subject to an additional award of 
up to $50,000.
279
 However, the equitable award was not payable directly to the 
victim of discrimination.
280
 Rather, the equitable award had to be used ―to 
correct discriminatory practices at the place of employment, or in the 
community,‖ or be deposited in an Equal Employment Enforcement Trust 
Fund.
281
 
                                                          
269. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
270. 137 CONG. REC. 13,553 (1991) (Roll No. 131). 
271. Id. at 14,122-23 (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (indicating the Senate had received H.R. 1 from 
the House and requesting that the bill be read for the first time). 
272. Id. at 33,942 (indefinitely postponing H.R. 1, S. Calendar No. 148, by unanimous consent). 
273. Id. at 13,138-40 (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (introducing S. 1209 in the Senate). 
274. See Govan, supra note 98, at 176. 
275. See 137 CONG. REC. 13,139 (1991) (§ 3(b)(3) of S. 1209). 
276. See id. at § 3(b)(3)(A). 
277. See id. at § 3(b)(3)(B). 
278. See id. at § 3(c). 
279. See id. at § 3(c)(3). 
280. See id. at § 3(c)(5)(A), (B). 
281. Id. 
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Curiously, the bill also directed, for the first time, that the new remedies in 
S. 1209 be codified in a novel and unlikely location. Specifically, S. 1209 did 
not add the damages provisions to the existing text of Title VII, nor did S. 1209 
add the new remedies to the text of § 1981.
282
 Instead, S. 1209 proposed 
creating a new section immediately after § 1981, naming it § 1981(a).
283
 
Senator Danforth retained this codification preference in all remaining bills he 
proposed in 1991, including the final bill passed by Congress.
284
 One 
prominent civil rights scholar commented that this was a ―circuitous route‖ and 
suggested that the location of these new provisions raised questions about 
whether Congress was ―trying to artfully . . . conceal the fact that its new 
provision effectively capped damages for women, while leaving them uncapped 
for blacks.‖
285
 The bill ultimately failed in committee, however, presumably 
because Democrats and civil rights leaders were dissatisfied that the equitable 
penalty would not be used to compensate the victim and that caps would be 
placed on compensatory damages, thereby limiting compensation for non-
pecuniary injuries such as pain and suffering.
286
 
Thereafter, Senator Danforth proposed another civil rights bill on June 27, 
1991, in an attempt to forge a compromise on the damages debate for Title VII 
claims.
287
 Senator Danforth‘s second proposal actually consisted of three 
separate bills that attempted to separate the contested issues by subject 
matter.
288
 Of this trilogy, only S. 1409 contained revised provisions related to 
damages available for intentional discrimination under Title VII.
289
 The bill 
included a number of features. First, it allowed victims to request a trial by jury 
in the event the victim sought to recover compensatory damages.
290
 
Additionally, the revised damages provisions in S. 1409 provided that the 
victim of intentional discrimination could directly receive both compensatory 
                                                          
282. See 137 CONG. REC. 13,138 (1991) (Section 3 of S. 1209) (declaring that ―[t]he Revised 
Statutes are amended by inserting after section 1977 [i.e. 42 U.S.C. 1981] the following new section: 
‗SEC. 1977A.  DAMAGES IN CASE OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT‘‖). 
283. See id. at § 3. 
284. Section 102 of the final version of the Civil Rights Act states, in pertinent part:  ―The Revised 
Statutes are amended by inserting after section 1977 (42 U.S.C. 1981) the following new section: ‗Sec. 
1977A.  DAMAGES IN CASES OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.‖ Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. at 1073 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(b)(3)). 
285. ABERNATHY, supra note 58, at 841. 
286. See Govan, supra note 98, at 206-07. 
287. 137 CONG. REC. 16,962-63, 16,968-69 (1991). 
288. See id. (statement of Sen. Danforth) (discussing S. 1407 and addressing attorneys‘ fees and the 
Martin v. Wilks decision); id. at,16,962-63, 16,966-68 (statement of Sen. Danforth) (addressing S. 1408 
and disparate impact claims); id. at 16,968-69 (text of S. 1409 addressing compensatory and punitive 
damages). 
289. See 137 CONG. REC. 16,968-69 (text of S. 1409). 
290. See id. at § 3(d). 
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and punitive damages,
291
 thus removing the trust fund and community 
provisions objected to by Democrats in S. 1209.
292
 Moreover, for the first time 
in any civil rights proposal, S. 1409 also created a combined cap for both 
compensatory and punitive damages, and expanded the categories of caps from 
the two categories found in S. 1209 to three.
293
 Specifically, combined 
compensatory and punitive damages for employers with 100 or less employees 
were capped at $50,000; damage awards for employers with 101 to 500 
employees were capped at $100,000; and damage awards for employers with 
more than 500 employees were capped at $300,000.
294
  The bill also required, 
for the first time, that the cap on damages not be disclosed to the jury.
295
  
Democrats and civil rights leaders criticized the revised caps and emphasized 
that S. 1409 lowered the amount of the cap for employers with 101 to 500 
employees from $150,000 to $100,000.
296
 
Despite considerable support for the bills among Senate Republicans, 
President Bush continued to express his opposition to both of Senator 
Danforth‘s proposals, just as he opposed H.R. 1 after it passed the House.
297
 
Soon, the exigencies of judicial politics intervened. On June 27, 1991, Justice 
Thurgood Marshall announced his resignation from the Supreme Court,
298
 and 
President Bush nominated then-Judge Clarence Thomas on July 1, 1991, to fill 
Justice Marshall‘s vacancy.
299
 Senator Danforth agreed to assist the 
Administration with Justice Thomas‘ confirmation,
300
 and the Senate‘s focus 
shifted temporarily from the civil rights agenda to Justice Thomas‘ 
confirmation. Justice Thomas testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
                                                          
291. See id. at §§ 3(a), 3(b). 
292. See Govan, supra note 98, at 211-12. 
293. See 137 CONG. REC. 16,968 (§ 3(b)(3) of S. 1409). 
294. See id. at § 3(c). 
295. See id. at § 3(c)(1)(B). 
296. Compare id. at § 3(b)(3)(A)-(C), with 137 CONG. REC. 13,139 (1991) (§ 3(b)(3)(A)-(B) of S. 
1209; see also Govan, supra note 98, at 212. 
297. See Neal Devins, Symposium, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955, 994-95 nn.188-190 (1993). 
298. See 137 CONG. REC. 16,883 (1991) (statement of Sen. Wirth); id. at 16,887 (statement of Sen. 
Metzenbaum); id. at 16,888 (statement of Sen. Harkin) . 
299. See Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States and a News Conference in Kennebunkport, Maine, 27 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 868, 869 (July 8, 1991). 
300. See 137 CONG. REC. 9234 (1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth) (announcing his support of 
Justice Thomas‘ nomination); Govan, supra note 98, at 217 (indicating that ―Senator Danforth became 
preoccupied, however, with the nomination of then-Judge Clarence Thomas. . . . Danforth committed to 
the Administration to shepherd the nomination of Thomas through the Senate‖). 
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on September 10-13, 1991.
301
 The summer had passed and a compromise 
seemed unlikely.
302
 
On September 24, 1991, Senator Danforth proposed yet a third civil rights 
bill in the Senate, S. 1745.
303
 The damages provisions in this third proposal did 
not differ substantively from the provisions of S. 1409, but S. 1745 did make 
cosmetic changes by combining the damages provisions with the substantive 
provisions from S. 1407 and 1408 to create a single, cohesive proposal.
304
  
Despite this third attempt at compromise, President Bush initially threatened to 
veto Senator Danforth‘s latest proposal.
305
 
Finally, by the end of October and after two years of unwavering 
opposition to comprehensive civil rights legislation, President Bush suddenly 
agreed to support S. 1745.
306
 Most scholars credit two political events that 
occurred earlier in October as a catalyst for the President‘s change in 
position.
307
 First, David Duke, a White nationalist then serving in the Louisiana 
                                                          
301. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991) (the initial hearings 
on the nomination were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee in September with Thomas testifying 
on September 10-13, 1991). 
302. See Devins, supra note 297, at 994 (explaining that by ―summer‘s end, the prospects for 
compromise seemed bleak. Bush, buoyed by the House vote, held to his position‖). 
303. 137 CONG. REC. 23,904 (1991) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (introducing S. 1745 in the Senate). 
304. See Govan, supra note 98, at 219-22 (discussing Sen. Danforth‘s attempt to incorporate 
revised versions of the prior three proposals into S. 1745); J.R. Franke, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
Remedial Civil Rights Policies Prevail, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 284 (1993) (observing that S. 1745 
―combined the three bills previously introduced by Senator Danforth‖). 
305. See Devins, supra note 297, at 983 (describing the timeline of the President‘s opposition to the 
civil rights act and explaining that ―[f]rom April 3, 1990, less than two months after the legislation was 
first introduced, to October 23, 1991, two days before the announcement of a compromise agreement, 
the Bush administration steadfastly claimed that it would veto this behemoth package of civil rights 
reforms‖ and the President ―on at least two dozen occasions publicly discussed this matter‖). 
306. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 297, at 995 (documenting that ―the prospects of another 
presidential veto loomed as late as October 23,‖ but on ―[t]he very next day . . . ‗marathon negotiations‘ 
resulted in a compromise that the President proclaimed he would ‗enthusiastically sign‘‖); Clegg, supra 
note 114, at 1469 (stating that ―[a]lmost immediately after the hearings, the civil rights groups and the 
administration reached agreement on a civil rights bill‖). 
307. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 114, at 1469 (explaining the impact of Anita Hill‘s testimony 
during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and noting that ―[a]lmost immediately after the 
hearings, the civil rights groups and the administration reached agreement on a civil rights bill.‖ Also 
discussing the ―ascendancy of David Duke‘s candidacy for governor of Louisiana at the same time‖ and 
describing how ―president Bush simply could not abide another race-charged national battle‖); Devins, 
supra note 297, at 996 (declaring that ―[t]he emergence of the Hill-Thomas and Duke controversies 
clearly raised the symbolic stakes of a Bush veto. Given Bush‘s erratic track record on civil rights and 
his apparent desire to place political popularity ahead of a principled vision, it is not inappropriate to 
conclude that the October 24 compromise was a political capitulation‖); Days, III, supra note 92, at 36 
(discussing the ―[s]peculation [that] continues to swirl over how the President, who had condemned 
Congress‘ earlier attempts as ‗quota‘ bills, could have found the largely identical Civil Rights Act of 
1991 worthy of support‖ and stating ―it [is] plausible that the damage David Duke‘s campaign for 
governor of Louisiana was doing to the Republican Party‘s image . . . and the bruising confirmation 
fight over Clarence Thomas‘ appointment to the Supreme Court persuaded the President that he needed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to salvage his reputation as a moderate on race issues‖); James Forman, Jr., 
Victory by Surrender: The Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 10 
YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 133, 171-72 (1992) (attributing the enactment of a compromise bill to two 
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House of Representatives, announced his plan to participate in a run-off 
election in November for Governor of Louisiana as a Republican candidate. 
President Bush wanted to distance himself and his stance on civil rights issues 
from any association with Duke‘s candidacy.
308
 Second, on October 6th, two 
media sources reported that Professor Anita Hill, a former employee who 
worked under the supervision of Clarence Thomas both at the Department of 
Education and during his tenure as Commissioner of the EEOC, alleged that 
Thomas had sexually harassed her during the course of her employment.
309
 
After receiving considerable political pressure,
310
 the Senate agreed to hold 
hearings on Hill‘s allegations.
311
 At the end of the hearings, the Senate 
confirmed Justice Thomas‘s nomination to the Supreme Court by a vote of 52 
to 48,
312
 but the hearings undoubtedly raised national awareness of the problem 
of sexual harassment.
313
 ―With the uproar over the confirmation of Clarence 
Thomas to the United States Supreme Court, and the likely impact of the 
confirmation vote in an election year, President Bush‘s veto-proof margin 
began to fade.‖
314 
Consequently, the President supported a compromise, 
bipartisan version of the Civil Rights Act (S. 1745) developed through last 
minute negotiations. 
                                                          
―extrinsic factors‖ including David Duke‘s candidacy for Governor of Louisiana and the Anita Hill-
Clarence Thomas hearings). 
308. See Clegg, supra note 114, at 1469. 
309. Christine A. Littleton, Dispelling Myths About Sexual Harassment: How the Senate Failed 
Twice, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1419, 1419 (1992) (explaining that Professor Anita Hill‘s allegations first 
―ran in Newsday and on National Public Radio on Sunday, October 6. . . . On Monday, October 7, Hill 
held a televised press conference‖); see also Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From 
Conciliation to Litigation–How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 
(1993) (describing the enormous impact the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings by referring to them 
as ―what many call the ‗Anita Hill Civil Rights Act of 1991‘‖). 
310. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Hearing Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1333-34 (1992) (describing her 
involvement in the letter signed by more than 120 women law professors ―directed to each member of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee  . . . urg[ing] the Senate to postpone the vote, to ‗take this matter 
seriously‘ and to begin full investigation‖ and further describing ―the image the newspapers gave us was 
of seven Congresswomen marching up the steps to the ninety-eight men and two women of the Senate 
and demanding a delay‖); see also Littleton, supra note 308, at 1419. 
311. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991) (hearings were held 
October 11-13, 1991). 
312. 137 CONG. REC. 14,704-05 (1991). 
313. See, e.g., Govan, supra note 98, at 224 (stating that ―three days of televised hearings on the 
issue of sexual harassment in the workplace did more than two years of activity by civil rights advocates 
to communicate the notion that the issue of civil rights concerns women as well as racial and ethnic 
minorities‖); Linda S. Greene, Feminism, Law, and Social Change: Some Reflections on Unrealized 
Possibilities, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1260, 1263-64 (1993) (discussing ―Professor Anita Hill‘s charge that 
Justice Thomas sexually harassed her, as well as the initial decision of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
not to hold hearings on the issue‖ and how that decision ―produced a catalytic effect on women and 
raised the problem of sexual harassment to a new level of visibility‖); Clegg, supra note 114, at 1469 
(describing the increased visibility of sexual harassment in the workplace as ―the nation sat riveted 
before its television sets, watching the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings‖). 
314. Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does it Mean and What is Its Likely 
Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304, 307 (1992). 
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The last minute compromise to S. 1745 that President Bush endorsed 
included additional revisions to the damages provisions in the proposal. 
Specifically, on October 25, 1991, Senator Danforth and Senator Kennedy co-
sponsored Amendment 1274.
315
 The Amendment retained the availability of 
compensatory and punitive damages for victims of intentional discrimination, 
but expanded the categories of caps on damages from a three-tiered system to a 
four-tiered system.
316
 The Amendment also divided the caps for middle-size 
employers into two categories. Under the original provisions of S. 1745, 
damages for employers with 101 to 500 employees were capped at $100,000.
317
 
In contrast, under Amendment 1274‘s provisions, damages for an employer 
with 101 to 200 employees were capped at $100,000, whereas damages for 
employers with 201 to 500 employees were capped at $200,000.
318
 The 
division of S. 1745‘s middle category to create the fourth tier was a 
modification specifically requested by Senator Kennedy, and not by President 
Bush.
319
 
Rather than expressing success in obtaining President Bush‘s approval 
after the two-year struggle to pass a civil rights bill, many Democratic Senators 
declared dissatisfaction with Senator Danforth‘s latest proposal. These Senators 
acknowledged that the caps for damages not only were insufficient, but also 
openly discriminated against women, treating them as second-class citizens
320
 
and creating an unjustifiable ―hierarchy of remedies.‖
321
 Others argued that 
                                                          
315. 137 CONG. REC. 28,676- 28,680 (1991) (Section 5 of S. Amdt. 1274). 
316. Id. at § 5(b)(3). 
317. Id. at § 5(b)(3)(A)-(C). 
318. Id. at § 5(b)(3)(A)-(C). 
319. See Govan, supra note 98, at 230. 
320. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 29,027 (1991) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (declaring that ―although 
the remedies for women . . . are an improvement over current law, I would have preferred that there be 
no cap on the amount of damages available to women . . . since we currently do not have caps for racial 
minorities under section 1981.  Congress should not allow women . . . to be second-class citizens when 
it comes to remedying the effects of intentional discrimination. When the harm is the same, the available 
remedies should be parallel‖); see id. at 29,031 (statement of Sen. Adams) (expressing that he is 
―extremely disappointed that the bill falls short in redressing discrimination against women. The bill 
says that discrimination on the basis of sex is less important than other forms of discrimination. Under 
this bill, women of color would be forced to abandon their sex discrimination claims and use claims 
based on race or national origin to bypass the caps on damages. Under this bill, compensation for 
damages as a result of sexual harassment or discrimination are capped. By capping damages, we relegate 
women‘s discrimination cases to second class status in the American legal system. Just imagine the howl 
of anguish from the business community if we sought to cap damages a corporation could recover in 
civil litigation.  There will come a day when this institution recognizes that sexual harassment cases 
should be taken as seriously as corporate litigation. . .‖). 
321. Id. at 29,008 (statement of Sen. Robb) (stating that he would vote for S. 1745, but that it was 
―a springboard to greater achievements. It is not an end; but a beginning upon the long road to a society 
in which people are defined not by gender or race, but solely on their capabilities.‖ Senator Robb also 
explained that ―[t]he underlying substantive debate, all along, was not about disparate impact or quotas 
but about damages in cases of intentional discrimination. Should women be allowed to sue employers in 
cases of intentional discrimination, the way minorities currently can? That prospect is what had 
employers up in arms. Not quotas, but damages. I happen to support giving women . . . the same scope 
of remedies available to those who suffer racial discrimination, and will support such subsequent 
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capped damages communicated that sex discrimination was not as 
reprehensible as race discrimination,
322
 sentiment expressed by many 
Democratic congressional members and some government officials the 
previous year during the hearings on the failed 1990 Civil Rights Act.
323
 For 
instance, Senator Wirth expressed particular dissatisfaction with the damages 
provisions of S. 1745 and its impact on the struggle to achieve gender equality: 
 
Mr. Wirth: . . Mr. President, I rise today to discuss what I 
consider to be a gaping hole in the Civil Rights Restoration Act before 
us today – a hole so large that I question if we can in fact term this 
piece of legislation a civil rights bill. By passing this bill, we will . . . 
also codify a premise that goes against the very grain of our Nation – 
it will say that we believe people should be treated separate and 
unequal. 
I think some people will be perplexed that now, while we are 
trying to establish some equity in our laws, we turn around and create 
a new injustice. Now that remedies are finally available for women . . 
. we are going to impose limits on their extent. Of course, no one else 
is limited, except for one slice of the population, which is singled out 
to be treated as second-class citizens and deserving only second-class 
remedies. In all honesty, I find it unfathomable that this is the course 
we have chosen to head into the 21st century. . . . 
Are there caps in the law for racial discrimination?  No. . . . [B]ut 
there are caps in this bill for cases of gender-based discrimination and 
sexual harassment. 
Clearly we are being unfair and unjust to impose caps on these 
kinds of discrimination cases. This action contradicts the very 
cornerstone of civil rights, the guiding principle of our country – and 
that is equality. It took us 125 years to provide women with the 
                                                          
legislation when it is offered. The current hierarchy of remedies simply makes no sense.  Under existing 
law, a black woman can sue for damages for racial discrimination, but if she suffers gender 
discrimination, she‘s out of luck.  Discrimination is wrong, and is not more or less so depending upon 
the demographics of its victim‖). 
322. See id. at 29,027 (statement of Sen. Dodd) (criticizing the President and arguing that his 
―minor changes in [the area of damages] suggests that his problems have been more political than 
substantive. . . . I believe there is no real difference between the sting of race discrimination and the 
sting of sex discrimination.  It makes good common sense to permit women to sue for damages when 
employers intentionally discriminate . . .‖); accord id. at 29,016 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (considering 
an amendment to make the provisions of Senator Danforth‘s bill applicable to Members of Congress and 
stating ―instead of having caps on punitive damages as we do on the underlying bill, let us take the cap 
off because it will not cost us anything. If we are also subject to punitive damages maybe there will be 
some cognizance of the cost of the law we place on the rest of America. Mr. President, George Orwell 
said it well in ‗Animal Farm‘ (1945). He said, ‗All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal 
than others‘‖). 
323. See supra notes 168, 173-76 and accompanying text. 
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remedies afforded to others – I can only hope that it does not take 125 
more years to remove the limits we have imposed. 
It is a matter of simple fairness to provide women . . . with the 
same remedies that the law provides to victims of other forms of 
discrimination. But now, in the name of civil rights, women . . . who 
are discriminated against in the workplace can take their cases to the 
courts, where they will be discriminated against again. That does seem 
ironic, does it not? 
I think women in this country are sick of this kind of treatment.
324
 
 
Despite these objections and the candid acknowledgement from several 
Senators that the caps on damages constituted sex discrimination, the Senate 
passed S. 1745 on October 30, 1991, by a vote of 93 to 5.
325
 
Thereafter, the Senate bill was referred to the House for consideration.  
Recall that the House had enacted H.R. 1 just four months earlier, and that this 
final bill did not contain a cap on compensatory damages and instead only 
capped punitive damages.
326
 Yet again, Democratic Representatives criticized 
the more restrictive caps included in the Senate bill and expressed outrage that 
the tiered structure in the Senate bill would prohibit some women, employed by 
smaller employers and thus entitled to a smaller cap on damages, from being 
fully compensated for their damages.
327
  Others criticized the tiered structure of 
the caps in the Senate bill, arguing that the lack of uniformity of the caps on 
damages violated the Equal Protection Clause.
328 
 Others contended that the 
                                                          
324. 137 CONG. REC. 29,021-22 (1991) (statement of Sen. Wirth). 
325. Id. at 29,066 (Rollcall Vote No. 238). 
326. See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text; see also 137 CONG. REC. 30,660 (1991) 
(statement of Rep. Brooks) (discussing the differences between H.R. 1 and S. 1745). 
327. 137 CONG. REC. 30,676 (1991) (statement of Rep. Pelosi) (expressing ―concern about the 
limits placed on damages that women can receive for sexual harassment and discrimination cases.  I am 
discouraged that we can allow sexual harassment cases to be judged on the basis of the size of the 
business a woman works for and not for the seriousness of the crime.  Women must be allowed to 
receive what they deserve in damages and not have an arbitrary limit placed on the damages.  This 
provision was obviously the sacrificial lamb for this compromise and women were sacrificed. . . . [T]he 
effect of the caps on damages is that women are discouraged from speaking out because their problems 
are not worth the same amount as others are worth under the law simply because of business size‖); id. 
at 30,676-77 (statement of Rep. Hughes) (declaring that ―I do not understand why the President sought 
to limit the compensation available to women . . . for the actual cost to them of discrimination. These 
limits are especially hard to understand when one realizes that there are no limits on damages for victims 
of racial discrimination‖). 
328. 137 CONG. REC. 30,671 (1991) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (expressing ―concern[] 
about the unconstitutionality of the sliding scale of damages that are contained in this bill.  This is a 
violation clearly of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Why 
should someone who is in a medium-sized business who has been a victim of the same type of 
discrimination, who has suffered the same damages, be limited in the amount that they can recover vis-
a-vis someone who has been victimized in a larger business? …The scale should be uniform, unlimited 
damages, zero damages, or some figure in between, but it should not have different strokes for different 
folks‖); id. at 30,685 (statement of Rep. Orton) (declaring that he has ―serious concerns about the 
constitutionality–under the equal protection clause–of the provisions of this act which would place a 
FINAL ZEHRT MACROED (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2014  12:50 PM 
300 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 25:300 
 
caps constituted a new injustice towards women,
329
 treated them as second-
class citizens
330
 by prioritizing race discrimination,
331
 and codified sex 
discrimination in the recovery of damages.
332
  Despite the multiple objections 
to the caps on punitive damages, the House eventually approved the Senate 
version on November 7, 1991, by a vote of 381 to 38.
333
 President Bush signed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law on November 21, 1991.
334
 
The examination of this previously neglected legislative history of the Civil 
Rights Act provides a basis for drawing several novel conclusions that might 
otherwise have been overlooked in the ongoing debate over fashioning 
adequate remedies under Title VII. First, it is clear that Congress considered 
but rejected a number of proposals that would have provided equal remedies for 
victims of race and sex discrimination.
335
 Not only did Congress consider and 
reject numerous proposals providing for unlimited damages for victims of 
intentional discrimination under Title VII,
336
 but it also considered and rejected 
                                                          
limitation on the amount of damages available for sex discrimination while no such limitation exists on 
damages resulting from racial discrimination‖). 
329. See 137 CONG. REC. 30,661 (1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (explaining that ―it is simply 
untenable to continue any longer the disparity in the civil rights laws which permits the recovery of 
compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional race discrimination but to deny these same 
remedies to victims of other forms of discrimination‖); id. at 30,673-74 (statement of Rep. Clay) 
(arguing that ―[t]he most troubling aspect of S. 1745 is its failure to provide full equity for women . . . 
who are victimized by intentional discrimination.  In my view, the cap that has been placed by S. 1745 
on the ability of women and others to obtain damages under title VII is unnecessary, unfair, and unjust.  
If we believe in justice for all, it remains for the Congress to perfect the remedies we would afford these 
individuals.‖); id. at 30,684 (statement of Rep. Cardin) (declaring that the legislation ―is designed to 
eliminate inequality in our society, yet it treats various types of discrimination differently‖); id. at 
30,686 (statement of Rep. Kleczka) (contending that  ―all persons harmed by intentional discrimination 
in the workplace, not just racial minorities, should have access to unlimited punitive damages‖). 
330. Id. at 30,645 (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (declaring that she has ―an awful lot of trouble 
with the civil rights bill, because it really has treated women as second-class citizens. It is like we are all 
supposed to be so delighted that after 200 years we finally got on the bus, but the problem is we are 
supposed to go to the back of the bus because it is capping damages for women‖). 
331. Id. at 30,671 (statement of Rep. AuCoin) (declaring that this bill ―tells women, like my young 
daughter, that discrimination based on sex is not as wrong as discrimination based on race.  It continues 
to give women a message that they are second-class citizens.  That is not equality.  That is not freedom. . 
. .‖); id. at 30,675 (statement of Rep. Hayes) (expressing reluctance and apprehension ―about this bill 
because it forces me to prioritize discrimination, and I should not be presented with such a choice‖); id. 
at 30,692-93 (statement of Rep. Atkins) (voicing his ―objection to the fact that the compromise Civil 
Rights Act places a cap on damages available for victims of discrimination on the basis of sex. . . . This 
provision not only treats women as second-class citizens, it may very well prove to be unconstitutional. . 
. . I have heard from many of my constituents who argue that these caps are a slap in the face to the 
women . . . of this country. . . . By capping damages . . . we are limiting access to equal justice for all, 
and we are condemning women . . . to second-class status. . . ―). 
332. Id. at 30,686 (statement of Rep. Richardson) (disagreeing with ―the caps on damages for sex 
based discrimination suits.  I find it ironic that a civil rights bill itself contains discrimination towards a 
particular group, in this case, women. . . . Although this compromise retains this glaring inequity, I am 
hopeful that the caps on damages will be eliminated in the upcoming year‖). 
333. Id. at 30,695 (Roll No. 386). 
334. George Bush, Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1702 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
335. Sperino, supra note 19, at 244. 
336. See supra notes 185-208 and accompanying text. 
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a proposal that would limit damages available to victims of race discrimination 
under § 1981.
337
 Either of these proposals, if accepted, would have provided 
victims of race and sex discrimination with a unified approach, and likewise 
would have disseminated a unified message to employers, namely that 
discrimination on the basis of any immutable characteristic is equally 
deplorable and reprehensible.  Instead, Congress restored the availability of full 
damages only to victims of racial discrimination under § 1981. 
Second, Congress extensively debated the inadequacies of remedies 
available to victims of sex discrimination, but despite overwhelming evidence 
of such dearth, it knowingly adopted an approach that limited a woman‘s 
ability to recover under Title VII.  Under the arbitrary damages scheme adopted 
by the 1991 Act, a victim‘s ability to recover compensatory and punitive 
damages is based on her employer‘s number of employees, regardless of the 
extent of her injuries.
338
 Indeed, that discriminatory regime is embodied in the 
structure of the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. A victim pursuing a claim 
of intentional sex discrimination must rely on Section 102 of the Civil Rights 
Act, and must comply with the arbitrary damage scheme that limits her 
combined compensatory and punitive damages to a maximum of $300,000.
339
  
In contrast, a victim alleging racial discrimination under § 1981 is directed to 
pursue damages under Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act and may receive 
unlimited compensatory and punitive damages.
340
 Additionally, the text of 
Section 102 itself very clearly acknowledges the double standard by clarifying 
that ―[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the 
relief available under, section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
1981).‖
341
 Therefore, Congress restored full benefits to victims of race 
discrimination in the same statute in which it placed an arbitrary limit on the 
remedies available to victims of sex discrimination. 
Third, the philosophical disagreement over the proper damages available to 
victims of intentional sex discrimination was the primary impediment to the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1990, and the Congressional debate in 1991 
again deadlocked on this issue. Representatives from both parties debated the 
appropriate remedies to afford women. Although Democrats repeatedly 
asserted that there was no valid justification for a separate system of damages 
for women, in the end, even they compromised the rights of women and voted 
in favor of limiting a woman‘s right to recover damages for intentional sex 
discrimination. 
                                                          
337. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text. 
338. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b)(3). 
339. Id. 
340. Id. at § 101. 
341. Id. at § 102(b)(4). 
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After two years of political negotiations, Congress enacted a civil rights 
bill that sent the unfortunate message that sex discrimination was not as 
intolerable in our society as race discrimination. In the years following passage 
of the 1991 Act, Senator Kennedy proposed numerous bills to lift the caps from 
Title VII awards, all of which were unsuccessful.
342
 Since his death, no other 
Senator or Representative has stepped forward to challenge this inequity. For 
more than twenty years, courts have imposed these caps to reduce the recovery 
of women in sex discrimination cases. We now will examine the consequences 
of this regime. 
 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE: CONSIDERING THE 
CHALLENGES CREATED FROM TWENTY YEARS OF LITIGATING 
GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER A TWO-TIERED 
DAMAGE REGIME 
 
Since their enactment in 1991, the caps on compensatory and punitive 
damages under Title VII have sparked tremendous controversy.  Over the past 
twenty years, critics have objected to the damage caps on a wide variety of 
grounds including their ineffectiveness at curbing discrimination,
343
 their 
inconsistent standards,
344
 and various more serious constitutional arguments 
including the arbitrary nature of the caps
345
 and their restriction of the power of 
                                                          
342. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
343. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Eliminating the Need for Caps on Title VII Damage Awards: The 
Shield of Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 477, 480 (2011) 
(advocating the abolishment of caps on damage awards under Title VII because they are inconsistent 
with the ―compensatory and deterrent goals‖ of Title VII); Michael W. Roskiewicz, supra note 16, at 
414-15 (―The problem of inadequate compensation does not occur under section 1981 when a victim of 
racial discrimination suffers an identical injury.‖); Vanessa Ruggles, Notes & Comments, The 
Ineffectiveness of Capped Damages in Cases of Employment Discrimination: Solutions Toward 
Deterrence, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 155-158 (2006) (―[The caps] diminish the deterrent effect and 
the societal compensation for egregious conduct by large employers.‖); Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of 
Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
735, 742 (2008) (―[R]eform in the application of punitive damages to Title VII cases . . . which would 
bring the statute more in line with other areas of employment law.‖) 
344. See Andrea Bough, Punitive Damages in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases: 
Redefining the ―Standard,‖ 69 UMKC L. REV. 381, 386 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Kolstad came about because courts could not decide on a standard for determining punitive 
damages under Title VII); Judith J. Johnson, A Standard for Punitive Damages Under Title VII, 46 FLA. 
L. REV. 521, 546-552 (1994) (discussing courts‘ inconsistent approaches in defining the standards for 
awarding punitive damages under Title VII); Judith J. Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary 
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 41, 42 (1999) (―[T]he courts have 
had considerable difficulty in articulating a uniform standard for exemplary damages . . . problems have 
included the courts‘ conflicting interpretations of the standard for punitive damages, inability to 
articulate any standard at all, and arbitrary treatment of punitive damages claims.‖). 
345. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 343, at 494 (proposing an alternative to the damage caps under 
Title VII because the caps are arbitrary); Nelson Lund, Retroactivity, Institutional Incentives, and the 
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juries under the Seventh Amendment.
346
  Despite these credible objections, the 
caps remain firmly ensconced in Title VII jurisprudence. 
Many litigants have attempted to circumvent the limitations of the caps by 
pleading parallel claims under both Title VII and state employment 
discrimination statutes.
347
 At least twenty-two states have enacted statutes 
prohibiting discrimination in the workplace,
348
 but the scope of these statutes 
differs widely from Title VII, includes broader protections from 
discrimination
349
 and applies diverse standards of proof.
350
 The damages 
                                                          
Politics of Civil Rights, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 87 (1995) (―[C]aps inevitably have arbitrary effects, 
denying some plaintiffs full compensation for proven injuries . . . . [They] compound this arbitrary 
quality by varying the level of the caps according to the size of the employer.‖); Sperino, supra note 19, 
at 243-45. 
346. See, e.g., Stacy A. Hickox, Reduction of Punitive Damages for Employment Discrimination: 
Are Courts Ignoring our Juries? 54 MERCER L. REV. 1081, 1097 (2003) (reviewing the reduction of 
numerous jury awards to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases); Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial 
Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 153, 157 (1999) (―The use of a statutory cap as a 
guide for remittiturs below capped amounts improperly transforms the cap into an implied schedule of 
damages.‖); Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh 
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 742-747 (2003) (examining the use of remittitur in federal 
employment cases over a ten-year period and determining that the doctrine ―effectively eliminates‖ the 
plaintiff‘s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment). 
347. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 486 F.3d 1205, 1207-10 (11th Cir. 
2007) (―[I]f Title VII cannot remedy the full extent of her injury because of its damage cap, then the 
remaining portion of her injury should be remedied as much as possible under the Florida CRA, and vice 
versa.‖); Hall v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 337 F.3d 669, 679-80 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(reversing the district court‘s reduction of the jury‘s award to comply with Title VII‘s cap and 
concluding that the amount awarded in excess of the cap should have been allocated to the plaintiff‘s 
claim under the Ohio statute); Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(affirming the district court‘s allocation of damages to maximize a plaintiff‘s recovery between dual 
claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, which 
also is subject to Title VII‘s caps); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 
493, 510 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court‘s allocation of damages in a sexual harassment suit 
brought under Title VII and Washington Law Against Discrimination to maximize the plaintiff‘s 
recovery); Martini v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass‘n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (reversing the 
district court‘s reduction of damages awarded by the jury to a victim of sexual harassment and holding 
that although the Title VII damages were capped at  $300,000 there was no reason to limit recovery 
under D.C.‘s civil rights statute); Pavon v. Swift Transportation Co., 192 F.3d 902, 910-11 (9th Cir. 
1999) (affirming the district court‘s allocation of damages to a victim of race discrimination who sued 
under Title VII, the Oregon state law, and § 1981, and rejecting the argument that the entire award 
should be subject to the caps under Title VII); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (apportioning the jury verdict‘s award to a sexual harassment plaintiff so that she received the 
maximum under Title VII and additional damages under the Missouri Human Rights Act). 
348. See Hickox, supra note 346, at 1083 & app. (containing a table outlining the availability of 
punitive damages in state employment discrimination statutes). 
349. See, e.g., CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 12,920 (West 2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(9) (West 2012) (making it unlawful for 
an employer to discriminate on the basis of reproductive status or birth control devices); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 39-2-215, 39-2-216 (West 2012) (forbidding discrimination on the basis of breastfeeding); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (West 2012) (broadly prohibiting many forms of discrimination 
including weight and marital status); see also Carr v. United Parcel Serv., 955 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tenn. 
1997) (construing the Tennessee Human Rights Act to impose individual liability on any ―individual 
who aids, abets, incites, compels or commands an employer to engage in employment-related 
discrimination‖) overruled in part by Parker v. Warren Cnty. Util. Dist., 2 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 1999) 
(altering standard as to vicarious liability for hostile work environment under the THRA to conform to 
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available under state statutory regimes also vary widely, with some remedial 
provisions providing unlimited punitive damages,
351
 others allowing only 
limited punitive damages,
352
 others providing for no punitive damages,
353
 and 
still others modeled largely after Title VII with caps applying to both 
compensatory and punitive damages at virtually identical levels.
354
  
Theoretically, this parallel remedy gives successful plaintiffs an opportunity to 
allocate portions of the damage award to both the state and federal claims, 
thereby maximizing the recovery awarded to an individual plaintiff.
355
 In other 
words, plaintiffs in certain states can rely on the overlapping federal and state 
remedies to achieve more complete enforcement of the statutory regime and to 
recover more complete compensation. 
Similarly, plaintiffs who bring dual race and gender claims § Section 1981 
and Title VII may also avoid the harshness of the caps by allocating the amount 
                                                          
decisions in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775 (1998), without reference to individual liability). 
350. See, e.g., Morgan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 559 F.3d 425, 440 (6th Cir. 2009) (observing 
that under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, punitive damages may be awarded only based on a showing of 
actual malice); Caudle v. Bristow Optical Company, Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1027 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the standards for awarding punitive damages under Arizona‘s employment discrimination 
statute and noting that these standards are stricter than those under Title VII); Kimsey, 107 F.3d at 575 
(noting that the standard for awarding punitive damages under the Missouri Human Rights Act is 
whether the conduct at issue is ―outrageous, because of the defendant‘s evil motive or reckless 
indifference to the rights of others‖). 
351. See, e.g., Dixon v. Int‘l Bhd. of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 83 (1st Cir. 2007) (indicating 
that the Massachusetts employment discrimination statute does not cap or otherwise limit punitive 
damages); Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (observing that 
the Missouri Human Rights Act does not cap punitive damages); Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc., 65 
Cal. App. 4th 833, 842 (1988) (observing that California‘s Fair Employment and Housing Act provides 
unlimited compensatory and punitive damages). 
352. See, e.g., the District of Columbia Human Rights Law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1403.13 (West 
2012) (allowing the award of civil penalties but capping them in varying amounts based on the 
employer‘s number of prior discriminatory practices); the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 760.11 (West 2012) (capping punitive damages at $100,000 for civil rights claims); the 
Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. §§ 4-21-306(a)(8), 4-21-311(c) (allowing the recovery of punitive 
damages only in certain cases involving discriminatory housing practices and malicious harassment). 
353. See Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act provides unlimited compensatory damages but no punitive 
damages); see also Timmons v. City of Tucson, 830 P.2d 871, 875 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that the 
Arizona Civil Rights Act does not permit an award of compensatory or punitive damages). 
354. See, e.g., Black v. Pan Am. Lab., 646 F.3d 254, 258 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that the 
damages available for employment discrimination claims under the Texas Commission on Human 
Rights Act are identical but coextensive with the caps available under Title VII); Johnson v. Spencer 
Press of Maine, Inc., 364 F.3d 368, 372 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming the reduction of an award of 
compensatory and punitive damages to $300,000, the same cap applicable under both Title VII and the 
Maine Human Rights Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.5, § 4613(2)(B)(8)(e)(iv)); see also Odom Antennas 
Inc. v. Stevens, 966 S.W.2d  279, 282 (Ark.App. 1998) (upholding an award of compensatory and 
punitive damages under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-123-107, because the 
award fell within the limits of the statutory caps and were based on the employer‘s number of 
employees). 
355. See supra note 347 and accompanying text; see also Magee v. United States, 976 F.2d 821, 
822 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that when a federal jury renders a single verdict under a federal and state 
cause of action, the plaintiff should be paid in a way that permits the fullest recovery possible). 
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of damages exceeding the Title VII cap to the § 1981 claim.
356
 By attaining 
overlapping remedies, these plaintiffs further advance the stated goals of 
employment discrimination statutes, obtain more complete relief, and deter 
future misconduct. 
This strategy is not without limits, however. First, it imposes upon courts 
the added complication of allocating the damages, and some courts have not 
allocated them proportionately to maximize a plaintiff‘s recovery.
357
 Title VII 
also forbids the court from ―inform[ing] the jury of the limitations [on 
damages,]‖
358
 thereby shifting to the courts the responsibility of remitting 
awards exceeding the caps or allocating them between the state and federal 
statutes. This allocation can raise legitimate federalism, separation of powers, 
and due process concerns, given that both states and the federal government 
have ―legitimate interests‖ in legislating within this area.
359
 In particular, 
similar claims of gender discrimination are worth more in some states than 
others.
360
 
 Courts also have misapplied the caps to create unnecessary reductions in 
verdicts.
361
  While courts admittedly are required to reduce verdicts to fit within 
                                                          
356. See, e.g., Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
differences between Title VII damages and damages under § 1981 and noting the Title VII caps do not 
apply to § 1981 actions); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 820 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming a 
jury‘s award of $1 million in punitive damages because Congress did not apply the caps to § 1981); 
Pavon, 192, F.3d 902 at 910  (affirming the district court‘s entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff on 
verdict under Title VII, § 1981, and a state law claim and explaining that plaintiffs need not choose 
between those remedies). 
357. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance 
About Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1372-75 (2005) 
(discussing cases in which judges have ―grapple[d]‖ with how to allocate damages between federal and 
state statutes). 
358. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (2006). 
359. See Sperino supra note 19, at 235; see generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as 
Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 428-34 (2003) (identifying several due process concerns that 
might arise in punitive damages awards occurring in multiple states); Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive 
Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1434-37 (2004) (discussing due process 
issues that arise when conduct is unlawful in some but not all states and how to determine the 
beneficiary of a punitive damages award). 
360. Compare Paterson v. State, 915 P.2d 724, 729-30 (Idaho 1996) (affirming an award of $1,000 
in punitive damages under the Idaho Human Rights Act in a sexual harassment case in which the 
plaintiff established over 275 instances of harassing conduct), and Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Tr., 33 F. 
Supp. 2d 729 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (remitting a jury‘s award of punitive damages from $800,000 to $50,000 
in a case involving a sexual assault with claims under Title VII and Indiana state law), with Weeks v. 
Baker & McKenzie, 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1166-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming $3.5 million 
punitive damages award against a law firm in a sexual harassment action), and Greenbaum v. 
Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (affirming a $1.25 million punitive damage award 
against a bank that had subjected plaintiff to a pattern of sex discrimination and retaliation over a six-
year period), and Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp. v. Flores, 955 S.W.2d 861, 868-70 (Tex. App. 
Corpus Christi 1997) (affirming jury‘s punitive damages award of $2,225,000 in a sexual harassment 
suit including claims of sexual assault brought under Title VII and state law). 
361. See, e.g., Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1997) (determining that a 
jury‘s award of $7 million in punitive damages in a Title VII and § 1981 claim should be reduced to 
$300,000 despite the fact that claims under § 1981 are not capped); Laymon v. Lobby House, Inc., 613 
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the Title VII caps, some courts have reduced the awards further
362
 by applying 
the Supreme Court‘s standards in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.
363
 This 
dual review is unnecessary, given that Congress satisfied any due process 
concerns by establishing the limits of punitive relief through the imposition of 
the statutory caps in Title VII.
364
 
Many legislators, judges and scholars have suggested reforms to the caps 
found in Title VII.  Some commentators have argued that the basis of the caps 
should be altered so that the capped amount corresponds to the egregiousness 
of the employer‘s conduct and not the number of employees.
365
 Under this 
proposal, punitive damage awards could increase incrementally based on 
repeated jury findings that the employer intentionally discriminated under Title 
VII, and any subsequent awards would have a greater capacity to deter.
366
  This 
reform does not fully compensate the victim, but instead ―define[s] the amount 
of the plaintiff‘s harm for which the defendant will be held responsible.‖
367
 
Other commentators have suggested that the caps be based on an 
employer‘s net worth, rather than its number of employees, because such a 
                                                          
F.Supp.2d 504, 513-14 (D. Del. 2009) (justifying the reduction of a jury‘s award in a sexual harassment 
and retaliation case of $100,000 in punitive damages to $25,000 because there was no evidence ―of any 
physical contact or abuse‖ and because ―most of the appalling conduct happened during [a single] 
party‖);  Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 403, 414-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reducing jury‘s 
punitive damage award from $250,000, which was within the statutory cap under Title VII, to $50,000 
because the defendant‘s conduct was not ―as reprehensible‖ as in other cases). 
362. See, e.g., Hickox, supra note 346, at 1090, 1093 (―The test established in BMW for evaluating 
the amount of punitive damage awarded in common law litigation does not transfer well to the 
employment discrimination arena    . . . [because it] ignores the fundamental difference between claims 
of discrimination and claims aimed toward economic recovery, as in BMW.‖); see also Sandra Sperino, 
The New Calculus of Punitive Damages for Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 
704, 714 (2010) (noting that the BMW case and other Supreme Court ―seminal‖ punitive damages cases 
involve claims of ―fraud, deceit, and intentional infliction of emotional distress‖ rather than merely 
presenting employment discrimination claims). 
363. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (directing reviewing courts to 
consider the following three factors in determining whether an award of punitive damages satisfies due 
process or is an excessive or arbitrary punishment: ―the degree of reprehensibility of the [defendant‘s 
misconduct]; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and [the] 
punitive damages award; and the difference between [the punitive damages awarded by the jury] and the 
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.‖). 
364. See Joseph A. Seiner, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and Employment Discrimination, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 473, 491-93 & n.158 (2012) (―There can be little doubt . . . then, that the courts need not 
reach the due process issues raised in Gore and State Farm when addressing employment discrimination 
claims brought under Title VII.‖) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501-02 (2008) 
(examining a punitive damages award under federal maritime law); Abner v. Kansas City S. R. Co., 513 
F.3d 154, 164 (2008) (―[Because] Congress has effectively set the tolerable proportion [for Title VII 
claims], the three-factor Gore analysis is relevant only if the statutory cap itself offends due process. It 
does not and, as we have found in punitive damages cases with accompanying nominal damages, a ratio-
based inquiry becomes irrelevant.‖); see generally Romano v. U-Haul Int‘l, 233 F.3d 655, 660 (1st Cir. 
2000) (―[A] punitive damages award that comports with a statutory cap provides strong evidence that 
the award does not violate the defendant‘s due process rights.‖). 
365. See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 362, at 726-27; Ruggles, supra note 343, at 161-62. 
366. See, e.g., Ruggles, supra note 343, at 161-62. 
367. See Sperino, supra note 362, at 726-27. 
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formulation would have a greater capacity to punish employers who engage in 
discriminatory conduct.
368
  In part, this proposal attempts to answer criticism 
that the current caps do not adequately deter large employers because the fourth 
tier does not differentiate between employers with 501 employees and those 
with one million employees.
369
  At the very least, some commentators have 
suggested that the tiered system should be modified to address this disparity by 
creating more tiers for extremely large employers.
370
 
Still other scholars have proposed a liquidated damages model,
 371
 similar 
to the current remedial provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act
372
 and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
373
  This proposal would entitle victims 
of discrimination to an amount equal to the compensatory damages awarded by 
the jury.
374
 Under this proposal, the caps would apply only to the compensatory 
damage portion of the award, and thus, the victim‘s potential for recovery 
would be expanded from the current system but not unlimited.
375
 
The most frequently proposed reform, however, is the complete 
elimination of the caps.
376
  Subsequent to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, 
Senator Kennedy repeatedly proposed legislation, beginning with the Equal 
Remedies Act of 1991, to eliminate the caps.
377
  The proposal to eliminate the 
caps is based on similar principles articulated in the 1990 and 1991 legislative 
debates, namely, that they ―create an unjustifiable hierarchy‖ between victims 
of intentional discrimination under Title VII and those pursuing claims under § 
1981.
378
  Specifically, this hierarchy is ―unconscionable and must be corrected‖ 
because the caps ―value[] injuries suffered by women . . . less than the same 
                                                          
368. See, e.g., Ruggles, supra note 343, at 160-61. 
369. See, e.g., Ruggles, supra note 343, at 155-57; Stuart J. Ishimaru, Fulfilling the Promise of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 25, 31 (2005) (observing that the caps under 
Title VII enable large employers to ―buy their way out of discrimination‖ without changing their 
employment practices). 
370. See, e.g., Ruggles, supra note 343, at 158-59. 
371. See Seiner, supra note 364, at 775-83. 
372. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). 
373. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006). 
374. See Seiner, supra note 364, at 775-78. 
375. Id. 
376. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 343, at 507 (advocating that Congress remove the caps under 
Title VII because they are unnecessary in light of Kolstad); Judith Lichtman, Almost There: For Women, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is a Move in the Right Direction, 19 SUM. HUM. RTS. 16, 17 (1992) 
(asserting that the caps should be removed because they prevent full recovery and apply regardless of 
the severity of the plaintiff‘s injury); Roskiewicz, supra note 16, at 414-15, 418 (arguing that the caps on 
compensatory damages should be removed to ―enable courts to fully compensate victims of intentional 
discrimination,‖ and to ―strengthen the message that intentional, malicious discrimination has no place 
in society‖ and emphasizing that ―[o]nly by eliminating the caps on compensatory and punitive damages 
available to Title VII discrimination victims can Congress accomplish its initial goal of absolute 
equality‖); Avon L. Sergeant, Are the Legal Remedies Available to Sexually Harassed women 
Adequate?, 20 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 185, 190 (1999) (―The damage caps that are imposed under Title 
VII should be removed.‖). 
377. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
378. See S. REP. NO. 102-286f, at 4 (1992). 
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injuries suffered by racial or ethnic minorities.‖
379
 Moreover, the proposal 
asserts that the caps create ―arbitrary, fixed ceilings on the amount of damages‖ 
that women can recover because the caps ―apply without regard to the 
egregiousness of the defendant‘s actions, the injuries suffered by the victim, or 
the need to deter others from engaging in similar actions.‖
380
  Additionally, the 
caps ―protect the worst violators‖ because they shield employers who engage in 
the most ―outrageous‖ conduct ―from full liability.‖
381
  In other words, the caps 
do not make the costs disappear.
382
  Rather, for the worst violators, the caps 
―simply shift[] those costs, forcing the victim herself to pay for a portion of the 
harm caused by [that] defendant.‖
383
  Title VII‘s current two-tiered approach to 
damages simply ―defies logic,‖ as ―[t]here is no justification for denying . . . 
equal remedies‖ to women.
384
 
Thus, the ultimate question is whether there is any legitimate justification 
for retaining the caps on damages. This question can be answered by examining 
the original justifications for the caps and determining whether they remain 
valid today.  In other words, even if the original justifications for capping 
damages had some legitimacy in 1991, they may not remain viable more than 
twenty years later.  The Bush Administration and its allies advanced three 
general justifications for capping punitive damages during the 1990 and 1991 
debates surrounding the Civil Rights Acts.  Therefore, we will review the 
merits of each of these justifications to determine their contemporary viability. 
First, the Bush Administration argued that unlimited damages would 
encourage frivolous lawsuits
385
 and that attorneys would be the principal 
beneficiaries of allowing damages under Title VII. The Administration went so 
                                                          
379. See id. at 5. 
380. See id. at 3. 
381. See id. at 5. 
382. See id. at 13. 
383. Id. 
384. See id. at 13, 15. 
385. See PRESIDENT‘S MESSAGE TO THE SENATE RETURNING WITHOUT APPROVAL S. 2104, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, S. DOC. NO. 101-35 at 2 (2d. Sess. 1990) (justifying the veto of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990 because ―[t]he bill contains a number of provisions that will create unnecessary and 
inappropriate incentives for litigation‖); MEMORANDUM OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ACCOMPANYING 
THE PRESIDENT‘S VETO MESSAGE, S. DOC. NO. 101-35, at 10 (supporting the President‘s veto by 
explaining that the damages provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1990 ―will create unnecessary and 
counterproductive litigation, serving the interests of lawyers far more than the interests of aggrieved 
employees‖); see also 137 CONG. REC. 29,034 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dole) (indicating the caps were 
necessary to ―significantly‖ reduce the incentive for filing frivolous lawsuits); 137 CONG. REC. 29,041 
(1991) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (discussing the ―inordinate fear‖ of unlimited compensatory and 
punitive damages and acknowledging that some lawyers file meritless lawsuits because of pure 
settlement value alone); but see 137 CONG. REC. 13,547 (1991) (Statement of Rep. Slaughter) (―[That‘s] 
what some opponents said on the House floor about the 1988 bill. One member, for example 
proclaimed: If this bill becomes law, without doubt there will be an open floodgate of lawsuits, making 
it extremely difficult for small businesses to stay in business. In fact, the Justice Department tells me 
that only 12 rulings have been made in 3 years. The floodgates did not open then, and they won‘t now. . 
. .  And can anyone name a business that failed as a result of the [Civil Rights Restoration Act]?‖). 
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far as to characterize the bill as nothing more than ―a lawyer‘s relief act.‖
386
  
This argument is easily refuted by the attorneys‘ fee provision in Title VII.  
Under this provision, attorneys‘ fees may only be awarded to a prevailing 
party.
387
  Thus, when a plaintiff‘s frivolous Title VII claim is dismissed, her 
attorney‘s hope of recovering his fee likewise is lost.
388
 
Additionally, the Bush Administration contended that compensatory and 
punitive damages were not necessary at all and defended the remedial scheme 
existing under Title VII on the grounds that the limited remedies of injunctive 
and declaratory relief provided ―adequate deterrence.‖  The administration 
further argued that the availability of damages ―transformed Title VII into a 
statute under which conflict in the workplace will be exacerbated and 
protracted, with costly litigation as the weapon of first, rather than last, 
resort.‖
389
 
This argument likewise has long been discredited.  Indeed, supporters of 
the Civil Rights Act refuted the adequate remedial scheme argument during the 
four initial congressional hearings held in 1990.
390
 During these hearings, 
numerous witnesses recounted details of sexual harassment and the 
inadequacies of equitable remedies to redress the harm suffered as a result of 
such discrimination.
391
  Additionally, members of Congress and numerous 
expert witnesses corroborated the witnesses‘ testimony by offering statistics 
documenting the rising prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace and 
employers‘ lack of incentive to achieve systematic change under Title VII‘s 
equitable structure.
392
  Quite simply, by the conclusion of these hearings, 
―proponents of the 1990 bill [had] accomplished their twin objectives of 
establishing the need for restorative legislation . . . and flushing out the 
principal conceptual weaknesses‖ of Title VII.
393
  After these hearings, the only 
remaining issue was not whether a monetary remedy should be made available 
to victims of sexual harassment, but rather the amount and label that should be 
assigned to such a remedy. 
This argument remains true today as current EEOC statistics document that 
the number of sexual discrimination claims (including those with allegations of 
                                                          
386. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,660 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also S. REP. NO. 101-315 
(1990) (minority views) (referring to the bill as a ―Litigation Bonanza For Lawyers‖). 
387. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -5(k) (2006) (―In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney‘s fee (including expert 
fees) as part of the costs . . . .‖). 
388. See e.g., Mary L. Topliff, Right of Prevailing Plaintiffs to Recover Attorneys’ Fees Under § 
706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k)), 132 A.L.R. FED. 345 §15[a] (1996). 
389. See 136 CONG. REC. 17660 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also S. REP. NO. 101-315 
(1990) (minority views) (referring to the bill as a ―Litigation Bonanza For Lawyers‖). 
390. See supra notes 115-42 and accompanying text. 
391. See supra notes 115-42 and accompanying text. 
392. See supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text. 
393. See Govan, supra note 98, at 58. 
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sexual harassment) continues to increase, with approximately thirty percent of 
all EEOC charges filed in the last sixteen years containing allegations of sex 
discrimination.
394
  This establishes that sex discrimination remains a significant 
problem in the workforce.  During the last five years, EEOC charges containing 
allegations of sex discrimination significantly outnumber charges containing 
claims of national origin,
395
 disability,
396
 age,
397
 and religious
398
 discrimination.  
Thus, employers not only lacked sufficient incentive to eradicate sex 
discrimination in 1991, but these statistics document that Title VII‘s capped 
damages scheme fails to deter sex discrimination in today‘s workplace. 
Further, the Bush Administration and its allies argued that innocent 
employers could be liable for punitive damages.
399
  Supporters of the 
legislation responded by referring to language in Section 8 of the act that 
―makes it clear that damages are available only in intentional discrimination 
cases, not in disparate impact cases.‖
400
 Additionally, Congress and the 
Supreme Court have addressed these concerns independently of the damages 
provision in the Civil Rights Act.  First, Congress created numerous employer 
defenses to claims of employment discrimination that serve as additional 
hurdles to any recovery of punitive damages.
401
  Likewise, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
394. See U.S. EQUAL EMP‘T OPPORTUNITY COMM‘N, Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Trough FY 2012, 
(providing statistics for EEOC charges from 1997 to 2012) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm. 
395. According to the EEOC, charges containing claims of national origin discrimination consisted 
of 10.9% of the total EEOC charges received in 2012, and 11.8% of the total charges received in 2011. 
Id. 
396. Charges containing claims of disability discrimination consisted of 26.5% in 2012 and 25.8% 
of charges in 2011. Id. 
397. Current EEOC statistics establish that the total number of charges of discrimination containing 
allegations of age discrimination comprised 23% in 2012 and 23.5% in 2011. Id. 
398. Likewise, current EEOC statistics establish that only 3.8% of all charges of discrimination 
filed in 2012 and 4.2% of all charges filed in 2011 contained allegations of religious discrimination. Id. 
399. See, e.g., Vol I, supra note 115, at 505 (testimony of Mr. Mark Dichter, attorney with Morgan, 
Lewis & Bockius) (expressing concern that under the act ― [employers] could be found liable for 
engaging in disparate impact discrimination . . . without any proof that they even knew about the 
practice at all‖); id. at 471 (statement of Professor Pamela L. Perry with Rutgers School of Law) (―[The 
Act] requires employees to demonstrate that the proved impact is attributable to the employer, not some 
other innocent cause‖); Vol II., supra note 115, at 519 (prepared statement of Glen D. Nager, attorney, 
Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue) (declaring that the act ―is fundamentally unsound‖ because it ―ignores 
the possibility‖ that ―there are a myriad of innocent causes‖ that could lead to a ―statistical imbalance‖ 
in an employer‘s workforce); Vol. III, supra note 115, at 628 (prepared statement of Commissioner Carl 
A. Anderson) (asserting that it would be unjust if the Civil Rights Act caused innocent parties to be 
found guilty of discrimination). 
400. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,657 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also 136 CONG. REC. 
22,176 (1990) (including the final language of the Civil Rights Act as passed by the House which  
provided for damages only in intentional discrimination cases). 
401. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e)(1) (2006) (establishing the statutory defense of a ―bona fide 
occupational qualification,‖ which allows employers to intentionally discriminate on the basis of gender 
and other characteristics under certain circumstances); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) 
(allowing an employer to show a legitimate business reason for the allegedly discriminatory action); 42 
U.S.C. § 5(g)(2)(B) (2006) (permitting an employer to establish that it ―would have taken the same 
actions‖ as a defense to mixed motive case); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006) (requiring an employee to 
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has limited an employer‘s liability, under the respondeat superior doctrine, in 
sexual harassment suits for acts of its agents.
402
  These legislative and judicial 
defenses are unique to employment litigation and provide sufficient safeguards 
to prevent innocent employers from being inappropriately punished for 
discriminatory conduct with or without caps. 
Finally, the Bush Administration challenged the impact that damages might 
have on small businesses, arguing that the imposition of unlimited awards 
would effectively bankrupt numerous small employers, thereby harming the 
national economy.
403
 This argument was unpersuasive from its inception 
because the provisions of Title VII do not apply to businesses employing fewer 
than fifteen employees.
404
  This minimum employee threshold excludes a 
significant number of employers from Title VII‘s antidiscrimination provisions, 
and many scholars estimate that around 15 percent of the workforce, or 
approximately 19 million employees, are not covered as a result of Title VII‘s 
small business exclusion.
405
 In other words, the definition of the term employer 
in Title VII is a distinct and separate provision
406
 from the provision capping 
                                                          
establish, as a perquisite to the recovery of punitive damages, that the employer engaged in intentional 
discrimination and acted ―with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights‖ of 
the employee). 
402. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013) (holding that ―an employer 
may be vicariously liable for an employee‘s unlawful harassment only when the employer has 
empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a 
‗significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits‘‖) (citing 
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 
545 (1999) (establishing that an employer is not liable for punitive damages under Title VII for acts of 
its agent that ―are contrary to the employers‘ good faith efforts to comply with Title VII‖); Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (creating an affirmative defense for employers to claims 
of sexual harassment by supervisors in cases without a tangible employment action). 
403. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 17,990 (1990) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (―[T]he thing that 
causes me more pause about his bill than anything else is punitive damage[s]. . . . [T]hat is of no 
consolation to a small businessman.  My State is virtually nothing but small business. . . . [L]et us say a 
guy has worked all his life.  He has 100 employees and maybe he is even worth $1 million. . . . It is that 
Damocles sword is hanging over your head when a jury sitting there is deliberating and debating your 
very existence and knowing full well that the plaintiff has asked for $3 or $4 million in punitive 
damages and may get $1 million, which not only puts you out of business but puts another 100 people 
out of a job‖); 137 CONG. REC. 29,042 (1991) (statement of Sen. Kasten) (declaring that the purpose of 
the caps on damages was to protect small businesses). 
404. 42 U.S.C. §2000e–(b) (2006). 
405. See, e.g., Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exception and the Single Employer Doctrine in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1197, 1999 (2006) (―Legislative favoritism for 
small firms has important implications for the effectiveness of federal labor policy.  Firms small enough 
to be exempt from Title VII employ more than 19 million employees . . . or more than 16% of the 
national workforce.‖); Elsa Miller, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: Preventing Backdoor 
Discrimination Acts or Closing the Door?, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 303, 322 (1990) (relying on a study 
conducted in 1988 regarding plaintiffs‘ reliance on Section 1981 to combat race discrimination rather 
than Title VII, and concluding that ―approximately 86.3 percent of all work establishments . . . and 10.7 
million workers‖ are not covered by Title VII). 
406. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (defining the term employer as ―a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees…‖), with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) 
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damages for victims of intentional discrimination and can continue to protect 
small businesses even if the caps are removed.  Moreover, § 1981 has never 
catered to the small business concern as it applies to all employers, regardless 
of size, and places a greater priority on reducing racial discrimination than on 
catering to small businesses. Indeed, § 1981‘s lack of a minimum employee 
threshold is another example of § 1981‘s more resounding commitment to 
eradicating race discrimination.
407
 By contrast, Title VII‘s tolerance of sex 
discrimination committed by this substantial composition of the workforce 
further reinforces the misguided view that sex discrimination is less 
normatively harmful in our society than race discrimination.
408
 
Since the initial arguments for caps are not persuasive, we next need to ask 
if any legitimate justification remains for compromising the value of sex 
discrimination claims under Title VII.  Surely we haven‘t bought into the 
notion, advanced by Glen Nager and Ralph Baxter during the 1990 
congressional hearings, that sex discrimination is more of a social problem and, 
therefore, an inherent and unavoidable aspect of the modern workplace.
409
 Even 
if that argument were plausible when it was asserted in 1990, it has since been 
refuted and has no place in today‘s society. 
The harder question to answer is whether society views sex discrimination 
as a lesser evil to race discrimination and, thus, has accepted the premise that 
claims of sex discrimination should be valued lower than those of race 
discrimination.
410
 To some extent, the Supreme Court has increased this 
                                                          
(2006) (establishing the first tier of caps on an employer‘s damages for those employers with 15 to 100 
employees at $50,000 in combined compensatory and punitive damages). 
407. See Robert M. Weems, Selected Issues and Trends in Civil Litigation in Mississippi Federal 
Courts, 77 MISS. L.J. 977, 1022 (2008) (―[P]laintiffs alleging race discrimination (but not sex 
discrimination) will usually find greater recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . . [T]he failure to recognize 
the benefits available under § 1981, as compared to Title VII, constitutes one of the greatest ‗litigation 
traps‘ for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases‖). 
408. See Jeffrey A. Mandell, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee Thresholds in Federal 
Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1076 (2005) (―Congress explicitly limited its 
scope to employers with a least fifteen employees, knowing that such a requirement exempted the vast 
majority of employers.‖). 
409. See Vol. II, supra note 115, at 630 (testimony of Glen D. Nager); id. at 55 (testimony of Ralph 
Baxter). 
410. See, e.g., Deborah Brake, et al., Centennial Panel, Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny:  
Evaluating Equal Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1997) (―[T]wenty-five years ago, 
it was a basic tenet of feminist legal doctrine that what we wanted was strict scrutiny for sex 
discrimination.   And here we are twenty-five years later, and we have not gotten strict scrutiny for sex 
discrimination.  We have got an awful lot of things that are not quite strict scrutiny‖) (reprinting the 
statement of Donna Lenhoff, General Counsel and Director of the Work and Family Programs at the 
Women‘s Legal Defense Fund); Deborah L. Brake, Re-Examining Gender Scrutiny:  A Symposium 
Discussion, Sex as a Suspect Class:  An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender 
Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 958, 963 (1996) (documenting that the application of 
intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination claims in the lower courts has resulted in inconsistent 
results); Kim Shayo Buchanan, Sexuality & Gender Law: Assessing the Field, Envisioning the Future, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1149-50 (2010) (arguing that there is a ―double standard‖ in the Supreme 
Court‘s Equal Protection jurisprudence); Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and 
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perception by assigning an intermediate standard of review to gender claims 
brought under the Constitution while reserving strict scrutiny review only for 
race claims.
411
  While the Court certainly has not been unanimous on the issue 
of the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to sex discrimination claims,
412
 the 
Court‘s contradictory jurisprudence has heightened the societal perception that 
sex discrimination is a lesser evil than race discrimination in American society. 
Initial opinions from the Court on the issue indicated that gender 
classifications should be afforded the same strict scrutiny as classifications 
based on race.
413
 Justice Brennan, in writing for a plurality of four Justices in 
Frontiero, clearly explained that sex discrimination is as severe and unjust as 
race discrimination and emphasized the similarities between the historical 
deprivation of legal rights of women and racial minorities: 
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was 
rationalized by an attitude of ―romantic paternalism‖ which, in practical effect, 
put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage. . . . [I]ndeed, throughout much of 
the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, 
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.  Neither 
slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own 
names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold 
or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children. . . . And 
                                                          
Now, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 419 (2008) (considering the modern impact of an Equal Rights 
Amendment to the Constitution and asserting, among other things, that it ―would result in strict scrutiny 
for governmental policies that discriminate based on sex‖); Lindsey Sacher, From Stereotypes to Solid 
Ground: Reframing the Equal Protection Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and its Application to Gender-
Based College Admissions Policies, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (2011) (arguing that the 
Court‘s immediate scrutiny is less muddled in the First Amendment context than with Equal Protection 
cases because ―the judicial discourse has not been dominated by the unmanageable concept of gender 
group ‗stereotypes‘‖); Ann Shalleck, Revisiting Equality: Feminist Thought about Intermediate Scrutiny, 
6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 31 (1997) (reaffirming the symbolic and political importance of strict scrutiny 
to Equal Protection claims for women while discussing the practical importance of the judicial degree of 
scrutiny). 
411. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (applying for the first time a higher level of 
scrutiny, rather than rational basis review, when evaluating a claim of sex discrimination brought under 
the Equal Protection Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (―Reed 
and subsequent cases involving gender-based classifications make clear that the Court subjects such 
classifications to a more critical examination than is normally applied when ‗fundamental‘ constitutional 
rights and ‗suspect classes‘ are not present.‖); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (―[W]e apply 
different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. . . . Classifications based on race or 
national origin . . . are given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of rational basis review 
and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to 
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.‖). 
412. Compare Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-67 (1948) (applying only rational basis 
review to a gender classification), with Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (applying an intermediate review to a sex 
classification challenged under the Equal Protection Clause), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
682-83 (1973) (plurality opinion) (advocating the application of strict scrutiny rather than intermediate 
scrutiny to gender classifications). 
413. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1973). 
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although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied 
even that right – which is itself ―preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights‖ – until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.
414
 
Despite the plurality‘s arguments for the application of strict scrutiny to 
gender classifications, the Court ultimately rejected this approach, choosing 
instead to apply only intermediate scrutiny to gender classifications.
415
 When 
Justice Rehnquist explained the justifications for applying an intermediate level 
of scrutiny to sex challenges, he attempted to draw distinctions between race 
and gender discrimination claims: 
 
[T]here are sufficient differences between race and gender 
discrimination. . . .  Racial groups comprise numerical minorities in 
our society, warranting in some situations a greater need for 
protection, whereas the population is divided almost equally between 
men and women. Furthermore, while substantial discrimination 
against both groups still lingers in our society, racial equality has 
proved a more challenging goal to achieve on many fronts than gender 
equality.
416
 
 
Several Justices have lobbied strongly for the application of strict scrutiny 
to gender claims, including Justice Brennan‘s plurality in Frontiero,
417
 and 
Justice Stevens, who supports entirely the abrogation of tiered scrutiny 
contending that ―[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause.‖
418
  Similarly, 
Justice O‘Connor and Justice Ginsburg believe that the possibility of applying 
strict scrutiny to gender claims is not foreclosed completely.
 419
  The majority 
of the Court still supports the application of intermediate scrutiny, however.
420
 
                                                          
414. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-685 (citations omitted). 
415. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (emphasizing that the 
government had to establish ―an exceedingly persuasive justification‖ to support its gender 
classification); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (requiring that gender based classifications 
serve ―important governmental objectives‖). 
416. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 154-55 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
417. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682-85 (1973) (Brennan, J., Douglas J., White, J., Marshall, J.). 
418. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
419. Justice O‘Connor applied intermediate scrutiny in Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, but because the 
statute in question failed to meet that standard, it was unnecessary to determine whether strict scrutiny 
might apply instead. See id. at 724 n.9 (―We need not decide whether classifications based on gender are 
inherently suspect.‖). See also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 26 n.* (1993) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (―[I]t remains an open question whether ‗classifications based upon gender are inherently 
suspect.‘‖) (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9 (1982)). The Court uses the term ―inherently suspect‖ to 
describe classifications warranting strict scrutiny. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 
(1971) (―[T]he Court‘s decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based 
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and [thus] subject to close judicial scrutiny.‖) (emphasis 
added). 
420. See Nevada Dep‘t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 754 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that ―heightened scrutiny‖ is the appropriate level of review to be applied in gender 
discrimination cases). 
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While it is true that the standard of review applied to race and gender 
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause is a different analysis than is 
applied in the employment context, it also is true that in both contexts, the 
predominant message has been the same: race discrimination is deserving of 
stronger protections than sex discrimination. 
The Court‘s stance on gender discrimination and Congress‘s adoption of 
the discriminatory damages regime matter because of the basic principle that 
laws serve as important symbols of what society values.
421
 Justice Brennan 
warned in Frontiero that discriminatory laws encourage discriminatory 
behavior when he stated that, ―statutory distinctions between the sexes often 
have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior 
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual 
members.‖
422
 So, too, Title VII‘s cap on damages for claims of gender 
discrimination serves to reinforce the view that women are regarded as second-
class citizens. This legislative ideology codifies and even encourages 
discriminatory behavior against the classes who are most vulnerable.
423
 
Whatever the reason, the Title VII caps may no longer be justified by 
claims of novelty.  Title VII is no longer a new statute and claims of sex 
harassment and discrimination are no longer a novel challenge for employers. 
Employers throughout this country acquired their awareness of Title VII‘s 
prohibition of sex discrimination with its enactment in 1964, and these same 
employers have been subject to limited damage exposure for intentional 
instances of sex discrimination since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.  Thus, employers can neither claim that subjecting them to damage 
awards for acts of sex discrimination will catch them unfairly by surprise, nor 
can they claim that damage awards punish innocent employers given the 
statutory requirement that damages only are allowed in instances of intentional 
discrimination. 
 
                                                          
421. See, e.g., Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of 
Interest in the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 793, 823 (2006) (―Laws act 
as a symbol of important social values not only through new legal doctrines that emerge from 
constitutional (and statutory) interpretation but also through existing law. . . . that is applied to high-
profile personalities.‖); Michael H. Shapiro, Regulation as Language: Communicating Values by 
Altering the Contingencies of Choice, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 681, 687 (1994) (―If society wishes to 
maintain certain preferences, attitudes, beliefs and dispositions, and if the creation and operation of 
particular regulatory or non-regulatory systems reinforces or attenuates them, then the ultimate 
justification or condemnation of regulation requires a perspective that sees regulation as the 
‗communication‘ of basic societal ideas.‖). 
422. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87 (1973). 
423. See Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (2003). 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF A COMPROMISED DAMAGE STRUCTURE 
 
Congress has never unequivocally committed to eradicating sex 
discrimination in employment.  Congress added the prohibition of sex 
discrimination to Title VII on the eve of its enactment in 1964, and many 
scholars believe that the purpose of that amendment was to defeat the 
legislation, not to demonstrate its intolerance of sex discrimination in the 
workplace. Even after sex was added as a protected characteristic under Title 
VII, Congress failed to give the statute teeth to enforce its provisions and only 
provided that its victims recover equitable relief and not damages.  Several 
decades later, Congress essentially was forced by inconsistent Supreme Court 
decisions to make damages available to victims of sex discrimination.  In doing 
so, Congress made a conscious and deliberate decision not only to limit the 
punitive damages afforded to victims of sex discrimination, but also to cap their 
ability to recover full compensatory damages.  By limiting both a jury‘s ability 
to deter and punish discrimination and a victim‘s quest to be made whole, 
Congress sent the unfortunate message that sex discrimination in employment 
is somehow more tolerable than race discrimination.  It is not. 
For more than twenty years, Congress has retained the same caps for 
victims of intentional sex discrimination.  During this time, women and civil 
rights advocates have focused their efforts towards obtaining some monetary 
remedy and largely have ignored their failure to obtain complete and equal 
remedies.  Given the vow of Democratic leaders to continue to seek equality 
and lift the caps, and their subsequent failure to achieve this promise, this 
complacency is misplaced. While the legislative history indicates that a 
compromise may have been necessary to ensure the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act in 1991, the original justifications for this compromise are no longer valid.  
Stated bluntly, it is unconscionable that Congress has failed to revisit these 
caps, not even to adjust them once for inflation, since that time. 
Many compelling proposals have been advanced for modifying or 
eliminating Title VII‘s current damage regime, but Congress has rejected all of 
them. While many of these proposals would increase the remedies available to 
women and minorities under Title VII, nothing short of eliminating the caps 
would deter and compensate claims of sex and race discrimination equally.  
Additionally, some of the alternate solutions would complicate further the 
calculation of damages for victims of sex discrimination by adjusting the 
punitive damage caps based on either manipulative variables, such as an 
employer‘s net worth, or subjective measurements, such as the egregiousness of 
an employer‘s conduct. With both of these proposals, however, damages for 
victims of discrimination under Title VII still would fall short of the 
unrestrained damages available to victims of race discrimination under § 1981. 
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The policy question that lies at the heart of this debate is whether we as a 
society believe that victims of sex discrimination in the workplace should be 
afforded less protection and legal recourse than victims of race discrimination. 
If we do, Congress can continue to devalue and diminish claims of sex 
discrimination by refusing to award full and complete remedies to its victims.  
But if we do not, then the clearest and strongest method for removing such 
conduct from the workplace is to eliminate the caps from discrimination awards 
under Title VII, and to punish and deter such employer misconduct with the 
same commitment and ferocity as we apply to acts of race discrimination under 
§ 1981. 
When Congress developed the limited remedies in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, the voice of women was muted, in large part, by their lack of 
representation. The 102nd
 
Congress had only three female Senators and thirty 
female Representatives.
424
 In comparison, the 113th Congress has twenty 
female Senators and eighty-two female Representatives, including the 
Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. 
With their increased influence, women are in an unprecedented position to 
persuade their colleagues in Congress to reexamine and eliminate the current 
damage regime under Title VII. 
Title VII‘s caps are discriminatory against women. They undermine Title 
VII‘s effectiveness by limiting the statute‘s capacity to compensate victims and 
to deter and punish employers who intentionally discriminate on the basis of 
sex. By abolishing these caps and eliminating the two-tiered approach to 
damages, Congress finally will demonstrate its clear commitment to eradicating 
sex discrimination from the workplace. 
 
 
                                                          
424. See OFFICE OF ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Women Representatives 
and Senators by Congress, 1917–Present, (last accessed Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/Historical-Data/Women-Representatives-
and-Senators-by-Congress/. 
